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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4671
This paper compares the wages of workers inside the 
United States to the wages of observably identical workers 
outside the United States—controlling for country of 
birth, country of education, years of education, work 
experience, sex, and rural-urban residence. This is 
made possible by new and uniquely rich microdata on 
the wages of over two million individual formal-sector 
wage-earners in 43 countries. The paper then uses 
five independent methods to correct these estimates 
for unobserved differences and introduces a selection 
model to estimate how migrants’ wage gains depend on 
their position in the distribution of unobserved wage 
determinants. Following all adjustments for selectivity 
and compensating differentials, the authors estimate 
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that the wages of a Bolivian worker of equal intrinsic 
productivity, willing to move, would be higher by a 
factor of 2.7 solely by working in the United States. 
While this is the median, this ratio is as high as 8.4 
(for Nigeria). The paper documents that (1) for many 
countries, the wage gaps caused by barriers to movement 
across international borders are among the largest known 
forms of wage discrimination; (2) these gaps represent 
one of the largest remaining price distortions in any 
global market; and (3) these gaps imply that simply 
allowing labor mobility can reduce a given household’s 
poverty to a much greater degree than most known in situ 
antipoverty interventions. JEL Codes F22, J61, J71, O15. We are grateful to Indermit S. Gill and his team at the World Development Report of the World 
Bank who built and allowed use of the database. We thank Samuel Bazzi for excellent research assistance. We received helpful 
comments from Christopher Blattman, William Easterly, David Lindauer, David McKenzie, Mark Rosenzweig, and seminar 
participants at Yale University and the Center for Global Development. This work was partially supported by generous grants 
from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and from AusAID. The paper represents the views of the authors alone 
and not necessarily those of their employers or funders. 
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Three questions have each launched a thousand papers. First, how large are the gaps in 
compensation caused by various types of labor market discrimination?  Second, how 
large are the relative price differentials in global markets caused by international borders?  
Third, how can public policies raise the incomes of poor households?   
 
We bring these literatures together with an estimation of the differences between the 
wages of workers in 42 low- and middle-income countries and the wages those same 
people would earn in the United States. This calculation at once documents an enormous 
form of wage discrimination, measures a massive cross-border price wedge, and suggests 
a policy that could dramatically raise the earnings of many low-income families. 
 
The first section of the paper creates baseline estimates of wage gaps controlling for 
individual observable traits. It does so with a unique harmonized database on the 
purchasing power price-adjusted wages and other traits of over two million workers in 43 
countries, including the United States. This allows us to predict wages of observably 
identical workers on either side of the US border for each of these countries. Crucially, 
the US data identify the individuals’ country of birth and, for the foreign-born, year of 
arrival in the US. This allows our definition of “observably identical” to go beyond 
standard covariates such as years of schooling, age, sex, and rural/urban residence. We 
can also compare workers of the same country of birth—implicitly controlling for 
culture, language, and social networks—and same country of schooling—which adjusts 
for the quality and relevance of schooling. 
 
The wage gaps that emerge from these initial estimates are large. For instance, in our 
preferred econometric specification,
1 a Bolivian-born, Bolivian-educated, 35 year-old 
urban male formal sector wage worker with 9-12 years of schooling earns an average of 
US$1,831 per month working in the United States but US$460 (at purchasing power 
parity) working in Bolivia. Hence the earnings ratio between these observably identical 
people is 3.98. We produce estimates of the wage ratios of observably identical workers 
for each of 42 countries—we call these ratios Ro, where the subscript signifies 
“observably identical”.
2  Bolivia’s ratio Ro of 3.98 is near the median, while the lowest 
such ratios we observe are from the Dominican Republic, at 1.37–1.43 (depending on the 
regression functional form) and the highest are for Nigeria, at 11.3–13.6.  
 
But wage gaps for observably equivalent workers do not necessarily reflect wage 
discrimination. The second part of the paper grapples with the fact that, no matter how 
many individual traits are controlled for, wage differentials for observably equivalent 
workers do not necessarily constitute evidence of wage differentials across workers of 
                                                 
1 We test the sensitivity of the results to econometric specifications, in particular relaxing key assumptions imposed in 
the standard Mincer functional form of wage regression specifications that have recently received important criticism 
(e.g. Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) in the US context and Rosenzweig (2007) for international comparisons).  
2 Rosenzweig (2007) estimates country specific skill price differentials comparing the same individuals on both sides of 
the United States border using the observations of wage changes of individuals from the US New Immigrant Survey. 
Those calculations heavily influence ours, but the results reported here are the first we know of that pool individual-
level survey data across countries to estimate the impact of borders.  2 
equal intrinsic productivity, as foreign-born workers in the US can obviously differ in 
unobservable ways from their observably identical counterparts back home. This issue is 
common to all attempts to measure discrimination. In other words, wage ratios for 
observably-equivalent workers—Ro—are not the same as wage ratios for workers of 
equal intrinsic productivity who would be willing to move from one country to another; 
we call this latter ratio Re.  
 
One factor that leads to wage gaps between foreign-born workers in the US and 
observably identical workers abroad is selection on unobservable determinants of 
productivity—selection both by the migrants themselves and by migration policy. The 
effect of selection on the wage gaps we measure is complex and we explore it below with 
a new theoretical model. The true wage gain to a typical migrant depends on two separate 
but related aspects of selection: where migrants come from within the source-country 
distribution of unobservable productivity determinants (selection), and where they end up 
within the destination-country distribution of unobservable productivity determinants 
(sorting). The higher is migrants’ typical position in the origin-country distribution of 
unobserved productivity determinants—all else equal—the lower is the wage gain. But 
the higher is migrants’ typical position in the destination-country distribution of 
unobserved productivity determinants—all else equal—the higher is the gain. 
 
The model shows that positive selection on unobservable traits from the origin country is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for overestimation of the wage gain to migration. If 
migrants come from the upper part of the distribution of unobserved productivity 
determinants in the origin and were randomly sorted into the wage distribution in the 
destination country, then comparing “average” workers would indeed overstate the wage 
gain. But if selected migrants sort into the upper end of the distribution in the destination 
country, the comparison of wages for average workers with given observed traits can 
accurately reflect or even understate the gain. That is, if the people who are uncommonly 
intelligent, energetic or ambitious in the source country selectively migrate and are 
people who are uncommonly intelligent, energetic and ambitious in the destination 
country, their wage gain could be the same as—or even larger than—the wage gain to 
less intelligent and energetic people. Furthermore, among those positively selected on 
unobservables from the origin, those bound for the upper end of the distribution in the 
destination are more likely to be seen in the data than those bound for the middle or the 
bottom—the former have more to gain from migration than the latter and are thus more 
likely to move. We match a theory of selection (from the source country) and sorting (in 
the destination country) with data to estimate the bias attributable to selection on 
unobservables.  
 
Another, separate factor that can cause the wages of observably identical workers to 
differ across countries in the absence of discrimination is what we call “natural” barriers. 
Workers might require a compensating differential to bear the costs—broadly 
considered—of moving to a new land. These include the difficulty of learning a new 
language, being away from one’s family, and entering new social networks, as well as the 
direct cost of travel. Workers might also be credit-constrained and have difficulty 
financing the move.  3 
 
Only a completely exogenous movement of workers across borders would allow 
estimation of wage gains without selection and without “natural” forces determining who 
is willing and able to move. We do not present (or desire!) such an experiment. Instead, 
we triangulate using five distinct methods to place estimated bounds on selection and 
natural barriers—drawing on theory and various empirical literatures. These independent 
calculations yield the remarkably consistent result that selection of migrants on 
unobservable wage determinants results in an observed US-to-foreign wage ratio for 
observably equivalent workers (Ro) of around 1.25 times the true ratio for equal-
productivity workers on average across countries, and that the combined effect of 
selection and natural barriers produces observed ratios about 1.5 times the true ratio for 
equal-productivity workers willing and able to move (Re). 
 
Even after this correction, wage gaps across borders remain extremely large. Given our 
median observed ratio Ro of about 3.9, the median ratio purged of selection on 
unobservable wage determinants and the effects of “natural” barriers—wage ratios of 
equally productive workers willing to move (Re)—is roughly 2.6 (=3.9/1.5). Even this 
conservative estimate of Re is above 3 for many countries—including India, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Ghana, Yemen, Egypt, Haiti, and Nigeria. In other words, a worker from one 
of these countries can expect at the margin his or her wages to triple or more, solely due 
to stepping across the US border. 
 
This wage gap is a “marginal” effect in two distinct senses: It is the effect on the wage of 
the next person who would arrive after a small relaxation of the migration barrier—not 
the effect on the typical person in the sending country—and it is the marginal effect given 
a small change in current levels of migration—not the general equilibrium wage under 
fully open borders.  
 
The final section relates our results to the three separate literatures on wage 
discrimination, border-induced price wedges, and the marginal impacts of antipoverty 
policies. Researchers measuring each of these would do well to pay much more attention 
to restrictions on migration; the wage gaps we measure constitute one of the largest 
known forms of all three. Empirical estimates in these other literatures are comparable to 
ours because they, too, are measured at the margin. 
 
 
2 Baseline  estimates 
 
It is obvious that there are large wage differences across countries; the question is the 
source of those wage differences.  Some of the difference might be due to sector of 
employment or occupational composition across countries (e.g. more lawyers in the US 
and more small farmers in India). But previous researchers have documented that wage 
gaps across countries are enormous even for workers in the same sector, such as 
manufacturing, or in the same narrowly defined low-skill occupations, such as carpenters, 
laborers, or bus drivers (World Bank (1995)). Table 1 gives a sampling of these estimates 4 
from other sources for the countries also in our sample. The ratio of real wages in the US 
to those in India for the same low-skill occupation is somewhere between 5 and 14.  
 
Table 1: Previous estimates of the ratio of wages in the US to those in other 
countries (PPP adjusted), without controlling for individual traits 
 
  Freeman & Oostendorp




Occupation Carpenter Laborer  Industry  Laborer 
Year  1995  1995 1990-94 2006 
Median 6.36  7.67 4.26 4.65 
N 12  11 28 13 
Selected countries 
Bolivia 6.15  6.37 5.32  
India 9.15  7.67 5.32 14.16 
Mexico 6.57  2.78 7.49 
Nigeria   10.60  
Turkey   1.99 2.97 
 
N gives the number of countries in the source that 1) have data for both the country in question and the US, and 2) are 
one of the 42 countries studied in this paper. Blank cells indicate no data for that country. 
 
But even in the same sector or occupation, workers in the US can differ from those in 
India with characteristics (e.g. education) that affect their intrinsic productivity. The 
unanswered question is how much of these observed gaps reflect differences in 
compensation between otherwise equally productive workers who would wish to migrate. 
Such gaps are (a) the result of wage discrimination (b) induced by border restrictions (c) 
whose relaxation would create large income gains for very poor people. 
 
Wage ratios adjusted for worker productivity (and compensating differentials) are our 
ultimate goal. We begin by laying out the assumptions that underlie the baseline 
                                                 
3 Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) calculate average monthly wage rates for male workers, in US dollars at Purchasing 
Power Parity, in 1995. “Carpenter” refers to ILO occupation code 88 (“construction carpenter”), and “laborer” refers to 
ILO code 90. 
4 Rama and Artecona (2002) calculate “industry” wages as: “Labor cost per worker in manufacturing in current US 
dollars per year. Includes male and female workers. Calculated as the ratio between total compensation and the number 
of workers in the manufacturing sector as a whole. Compensation includes direct wages, salaries and other 
remuneration paid directly by the employer; plus all employers’ contributions to social security programs on behalf of 
their employees. Data on labor costs per worker are from plant-level surveys covering relatively large firms, mostly in 
the formal sector of the economy. Figures are converted into US dollars using the average exchange rate for each year. 
In countries of the former Soviet Union, the exchange rate of 1989 is used for previous years.” “Government” wage is 
“Average wage of employees in the central or general government, in current US dollars per year. Includes male and 
female employees. Calculated dividing the government payroll by the total number of employees. Data are from 
government records. Figures are converted into US dollars using the average exchange rate for each year.” Both of 
these are converted to PPP dollars using the PPP-to-official-exchange-rate ratio from World Bank (2007).  
5 The UBS estimates (Hoefert and Hofer (2007)) are for urban areas (respectively: Buenos Aires, New Delhi, Seoul, 
Mexico City, Manila, Bangkok, and Istanbul, with the US represented by New York City), and show the hourly wage 
(assuming 50 working weeks per year) of a “building laborer”, 25 years old, single, unskilled or semi-skilled (p. 41) 
adjusted for cost of living in each city by the prices of 95 goods and 27 services (p. 8). 5 
estimates of wage ratios for observably equivalent workers Ro, and calculating these 
ratios for 42 countries. 
 
2.1  The estimation problem 
 
Our analysis takes the vantage point of the migrant destination country, thus h (“home”) 
is the country of destination (US) and f (“foreign”) is the country of migrant origin. 
People move until wages in foreign equal wages in the US but for a factor  0 ≥ δ , so that 
() h f w w = +δ 1 . 
 
The wedge () ( ) ( ) p n δ δ δ + + ≡ + 1 1 1  is the result of two forces. The wedge  δn represents 
the effect of “natural” barriers such as credit constraints, transportation costs, language 
differences, psychic costs of leaving home, and job-search in an unfamiliar setting, which 
requires a compensating differential to make a mover indifferent between moving and 
staying in the absence of any policy-based impediments. The other element, δp, represents 
Becker’s (1971) “discrimination coefficient”—the cumulative result of all policy barriers 




The wage of an individual i born in home and residing in home is denoted
i
hh w , where the 
first subscript denotes country of birth and the second subscript denotes country of 
residence. That wage is the product of a function  hh θ  of a vector of individually specific 
observable traits x
i (schooling, age, sex, and rural/urban residence) and a function  hh φ  of 
a vector of unobservable wage determinants
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fh x x w ′ ≡ φ θ , the wage of a person with traits x and  x′ 
born in foreign who has migrated to home. 
 
This is captured simply and intuitively by the ratio of home wages to foreign wages for a 





i w w R / ≡ so that:  
 















= 1 1 ] [ . (1) 
 
The estimation problem of (1) is that, at any given moment, the counterfactual 
i
ff w  is 
unobservable for those who have migrated from foreign (e.g. Bolivia) to home (the US) 
as they are working in the US.  
 
                                                 
6 It is certainly possible for governments to affect the psychic costs of leaving home, language usage, and so forth. We 
abstract away from minor effects of this kind and consider the main effect of government action on wage gaps to arise 
through restrictions on entry and domestic job-search placed upon people who reside in other countries. 6 
2.2  The selected migrant 
 
Our starting point to estimate quantity (1) is a set of identifying assumptions that we will 
later relax. This set of assumptions A1, which permit unbiased measurement of Ro for the 
marginal selected migrant, are: 
 
•  that the wage returns to migrants’ attributes,  () ⋅ fh θ  and  () ⋅ fh φ , can be 
approximated by the observed wage returns to the observable and unobservable 
traits of those who have already migrated from foreign to the US, denoted by 
() ⋅ fh θ ˆ  and  () ⋅ fh φ ˆ ; 
•  that the unobserved traits 
i x′  of the typical migrant do not differ from the 
unobserved traits of the non-migrant; 
•  that the partial association of wages and unobservable traits in foreign is 
independent of the same association in home 








fh x E x E x x E ′ ′ = ′ ′ φ φ φ φ / / ; 
•  and that migration is costless to the migrant. 
 
In other words, if we restrict ourselves to consideration of the marginal migrant, if we 
assume that the marginal migrant’s unobserved traits are identical to those of non-
migrants, and if we assume that the translation of unobserved traits into wages happens in 
independent fashion on each side of the border, then we can estimate  p e R δ + ≡1 . In this 
case, equation (1) reduces to: 
 






e x E x
x E x





φ θ ˆ ˆ
] | [ | 1 1 . (2) 
 
The right-hand side of (2) is observable. The result is an estimate of the ratio of wages 
after and before migration from foreign to home of the typical selected migrant with 
observed traits x
i and unobserved traits
i x′ . Notably, it does not assume that observable 
traits have the same return in foreign and home. We can test whether or not being born in 
Ghana or educated in Ghana, for example, have different wage returns in the US labor 
market relative to Ghana’s. 
 
On the other hand, it has important disadvantages: It makes the strong assumption that 
the unobserved traits of emigrants from foreign are the same as the unobserved traits of 
non-migrants. In particular, if there is positive selection on unobservables—if the 
unobserved traits of migrants contribute positively to their earnings relative to non-
migrants—then the estimate (2) will be biased upwards by a factor  s δ + 1  (“selection”). 
Furthermore, nonzero costs of migration will bias estimates of (2) by the wedge  n δ + 1.  
To the extent that there is selection and that migration is costly, estimates of (2) will be 
wage ratios for observably identical workers (Ro) rather than for equal-productivity 
workers willing to move (Re).: 
 7 
    () ( ) ( )( )( ) p s n e s n o R R δ δ δ δ δ + + + = + + = 1 1 1 1 1 , (3) 
 
that is, a combination of natural barriers, selection, and policy-induced wage 
discrimination. We will return to the subject of selection in detail below. It turns out that 
the effect of this assumption on the estimates is closely related to the assumption of the 
independence of  ( )
i
fh x′ φ  and ( )
i




We estimate equation (2) using unusually rich and standardized collection of individual 
level data sets on wage-earners compiled by the World Bank
7 plus the US Census Public 
Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) five percent file. 
 
A series of steps brings us from the raw collection of data sets to the estimation sample. 
First, we remove all self-employed people and unpaid family workers from the data, 
leaving only wage-earners. This has the advantage of increasing the comparability and 
accuracy of the earnings measures, but has the disadvantage of eliminating a large portion 
(though not all) of the informal sector from the sample—especially many agriculturists in 
the poorest countries. Second, we remove all people aged 14 or less and all people aged 
66 or greater, as well as all people reporting zero wage earnings. Third, we remove data 
from twelve transition countries because many of these countries were undergoing 
extraordinary instability of prices, wages, and currencies at the time the survey was 
administered. Rather than picking and choosing among them we just eliminated the 
transition countries as a block.
8  Fourth, we randomly delete US-born US-residents from 
the PUMS to reduce the size of that group from about 6.13 million to about half a 
million, due to binding memory constraints in the microcomputer conducting the 
statistical analysis (the resulting group was 8.15% of its original size, so the sampling 
weight of each remaining individual was multiplied by 12.257). Fifth, we drop Chad from 
the sample because the sample of US residents in the public-use data does not happen to 
contain any working-age wage-earners born in Chad. Finally, we drop Honduras from the 
sample for reasons described below. 
 
The result is a data set with 2,015,411 wage-earners residing in 43 countries. This 
comprises 891,158 individuals residing in 42 developing countries, 623,934 individuals 
born in those same 42 developing countries but residing in the US, and 500,319 
individuals born in the US and residing in the US. Each individual record contains the 
person’s wage in 1999 US dollars at Purchasing Power Parity, country of residence, years 
of schooling, age, sex, an indicator of urban or rural residence, and indicator variables for 
the periodicity of the reported wage (weekly, monthly, etc., with monthly as the base 
group). For those residing in the US, there is additional information on country of birth 
and year of arrival for the foreign-born. A sampling weight is assigned to each 
                                                 
7 The sources for all data are given in the appendix. The basic database is also described in Montenegro and Hirn 
(2008). 
8 The twelve we remove are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Republic of 
Macedonia, Russia, Romania, and Slovakia. 8 
observation indicating the number of individuals in the national population represented 
and is used in all regressions. 
 
The US census data were collected for the year 1999 while the surveys were in the 1990s 
and early 2000s (only India’s survey was carried out in 1999). We convert each wage 
estimate in current year local currency to current year US dollars at Purchasing Power 
Parity using factors from the World Bank (2007) and then deflate these dollar amounts to 
1999 PPP US dollars using the PPP factor deflator.
9  To the extent that real wages rose 
(or fell) relative to the US between 1999 and the year of a country’s survey, the wage 
ratios for those countries will be slightly under (or over) estimated. Converting to PPP 
also naturally introduces the possibility that errors in any given country’s PPP calculation 
could affect the results; note, however, that each of the 42 wage ratios we calculate is 
independent of any data from the 41 other countries. Thus any error in any one country’s 
PPP rate does not propagate to the other estimates. 
 
By using PPP exchange rates we assume that all consumption of the wage gain occurs in 
the US, which substantially understates the gains to overall earnings for migrant families, 
in two ways.  First, this ignores remittances.  If a worker is in one country with nuclear 
family members in another, and if we assume a unitary household utility function, then 
household consumption should be deflated in the location where consumption occurs.  
This suggests at the least that all remittances should enter the analysis at sending country 
prices (official exchange rates), not PPP.  Second, migrants, and especially temporary 
workers, should optimally have very high savings rates.  A simple model of intertemporal 
consumption smoothing would suggest that if a worker had access to a much higher wage 
rate for an explicitly temporary period they should optimally smooth these windfall gains 
over his or her lifetime.  Alternatively, temporary migration is often modeled as driven by 
“target savers” who accumulate savings for a specific purpose (e.g. a house, business, car, 
wedding/marriage), consumption that again would occur in their country of origin.  
Much, perhaps most consumption of the US earnings of temporary migrants would be in 
their own country, not the US. 
 
For instance, take our median country, Bolivia.  The ratio of official exchange rate (5.81 
LCU/$) to PPP (2.09 LCU/PPP$) in 1999 was 2.78.  Assuming all consumption occurs in 
the US produces a wage ratio for our base case observably identical worker of 4 at PPP.  
If one assumes that half of consumption is in Bolivia the ratio would be 7.5 and if only 20 
percent of consumption were in the US (a combination of remittances and very high 
propensity to save) the ratio would be 9.7.  The mean ratio of official to PPP exchange 
rates for countries with GDP per capita under PPP $10,000 in 1999 was 3.7 (larger than 
Bolivia’s).  At this ratio of official to PPP exchange rates even if only 20 percent of 
migrant worker earnings in the US were consumed (through remittances of savings) in 
their home country this would mean our estimates were understated by a factor of 1.5 and 
if as much as 50 percent were consumed in their home country the PPP comparisons 
                                                 
9 After we carried out our analysis the World Bank announced intentions to retroactively adjust the PPP factors we use, 
but these were unavailable at the time of writing. We note, however, that the most important adjustments foreseen are 
those to India’s and China’s PPP factors, both of which will tend to lower the PPP dollar-value of non-migrants’ 
earnings and therefore make the wage ratios reported here tend to underestimate the true ratios. 9 
understate welfare gains by more than a factor of 2. In the spirit of keeping our results as 
conservative as possible the paper will devote a great deal of attention to adjustments, 
such as for migrant selectivity or compensating differentials that scale down the raw 
estimates of wage differentials. But we highlight the fact that our assumption that all 
consumption occurs in the destination country goes a long way toward ensuring that our 
estimates understate the gaps in real wages we document. 
 
A key question is the reliability and comparability of reported earnings. Research 
comparing multiple sources of income data at the individual level suggest that self-
reported income is an unbiased estimator of true income, both in rich countries (Bound 
and Krueger (1991)) and in poor countries (Akee (2007a)). There is less certainty about 
comparability. Wage data for the US reflect total earnings from all jobs, whereas wage 
data for the 42 developing countries in our sample reflect wages from the respondent’s 
principal occupation. For the vast majority of formal-sector wage earners in the sample 
we nevertheless expect wage earnings from the principal occupation to closely reflect 
total wage earnings. Furthermore, wage data for the United States reflect gross earnings 
before taxes, and we expect that most people responding to a general question about their 
wages or earnings would have provided gross wages on most of the country surveys, but 
for a handful of countries it may be that the responses reflect after-tax wages.
10  If 
respondents provided net-of-tax instead of gross wages this would result in some upward 
bias to our estimated Ro. This bias will be small, however, if it is present at all. Formal-
sector income taxes are on the order of 5% in most developing countries (Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993)). For the median ratio of 3.92, for example, a 5% underestimation of the 
denominator means that the corrected ratio is 3.73.  
 
2.4  Method 
 
We seek estimates of international wage ratios for equal-productivity workers (Re); we 
begin by estimating wage ratios for observably-identical workers (Ro). First we compare 
workers residing in one pair of countries at a time—the US and another country j ∈ J—
estimating a separate regression for each country j. We do this with three different 
regression specifications. We discuss the standard Mincer specification first since it is the 
easiest to describe, though we rely on it the least:  
 












































































                                                 
10 In a small number of the countries (such as Yemen) the survey explicitly requests after-tax earnings, and in a few of 
the others (such as Chile) custom may dictate that formal sector “wages” refer to after-tax earnings unless otherwise 
specified. The text of the wage question from each survey is in the Appendix. 10 
Where wij is the wage of person i in country j. In the Mincer specification ζ is a vector of 
coefficients to be estimated and Xij is age, age squared, an indicator variable for sex, and 
an indicator variable for residence in a rural area. 
 
The number of years of schooling is denoted sij, and each δ and β is a coefficient to be 
estimated. The intercept and slope term on schooling are allowed to differ across four 
values of the indicator variables that combine country of birth and country of residence. 
r
ij I  (r for “resident” of country j) takes the value 1 if individual i resides in country j, or 0 
otherwise; these are people born in foreign, residing in foreign. 
l
ij I (l for a “late” arriver) 
is 1 if individual i was born in country j, now resides in the US, and arrived in the US at 
or above age 20. 
e
ij I  (e for early arriver) takes the value 1 if individual i was born in 
country j, now resides in the US, and arrived in the US below age 20. As the base group 
is the United States, scalar  0 β  is the coefficient on years of schooling for US-born US-
residents, and 
r
j β β + 0 is the coefficient on schooling for residents of country j. 
 
We distinguish between early and late arrivers because we do not wish to assume that a 
year of schooling acquired abroad has the same value in the US labor market as a year of 
schooling acquired in the US. We assume that most late arrivers received most of their 
education in their countries of birth. Since we focus on workers with education of 12 
years or less, virtually all of those with 9–12 years of education who arrived at or after 
age 20 were indeed educated in their country of birth.  
 
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) question the validity of assumptions underlying the 
traditional Mincer functional form, so we also estimate two alternative specifications. 
The ‘extended’ Mincer specification includes quadratic and cubic terms in years of 
schooling, sex, and age (and their interactions).
11 We do not present the results from the 
‘extended’ specification, as the estimates of wage ratios based on this less restrictive 
functional form do not differ substantially from those of the standard Mincer 
specification. In our second alternative, the ‘category’ specification—on which our 
analysis focuses—the columns of Xij contain indicator variables for nine quinquennial age 
groups, an indicator variable for sex, and an indicator variable for residence in a rural 
area. In that specification, sij is a vector of five indicator variables for different levels of 




j β , 
and 
e
j β  are also 5×1 vectors of coefficients to be estimated.
12  Aside from defining age 
and education groups, this last makes no assumptions about the functional form of the 
relationship between wages and schooling or age. This is particularly important as it 
                                                 
11 This addresses the ambiguity of functional form by Stone-Weierstrass approximation of the unknown function with 
higher-order polynomials. Letting a = age and g = sex, the “extended” Mincer specification replaces the constant, sex, 









λμν β ij ij ij s a g . 
12 The six schooling categories are: 1) zero (base group), 2) 1-4 years, 3) 5-8 years, 4) 9-12 years, 5) 13-16 years, and 
6) 17-28 years. The ten age categories are 1) 15-19 (base group), 2) 20-24, 3) 25-29, 4) 30-34, 5) 35-39, 6) 40-44, 7) 
45-49, 8) 50-54, 9) 55-59, 10) 60-65 (intentionally includes 65). 11 
reduces the influence of returns to tertiary/higher education on the estimates of returns to 
earlier education. 
 
The raw regression results from estimating equation (4) for the Mincer specification for 
each of the 42 countries are given in Appendix Table A1. The results from the category 
specification are given in Appendix Table A2.
13 
 
From these bilateral regression results we estimate (2), the ratio of the expected wage of 
an individual—with s years of education, born and educated in country j (“late” arrival) 
but now working in the US—to the expected wage of the observably equivalent person 
working in the foreign country of birth j:   
 










β β δ δ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ








j β δ δ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , and 
r
j β ˆ  are empirical estimates of the corresponding parameters. 
Regression (4) allows estimation of other versions of (5) as well, such as comparison of 
the wage of an “early” arrival (many of which received education in the US) to the wage 
of a foreign resident. 
 
2.5  Baseline estimates of wage ratios from bilateral regressions 
 
Table 2 presents a variety of the wage ratio estimates. Columns I-III report the results of 
the regressions using education and age categories, as these are our preferred estimate as 
they impose fewer assumptions about the structure of wage profiles than the standard 
Mincer specifications. They also compare individuals who are the most similar: foreign-
born, foreign-educated (late-arrival) people on either side of the border, allowing 
education acquired abroad to have different returns than education acquired in the US. 
With this specification the median  o R ˆ  for 9-12 years of schooling is 3.9. The highest is 
Nigeria at 13.6 (earning $1,625/month in the US versus $120/month in Nigeria) while the 
lowest is Dominican Republic at 1.4 ($1,553 versus $1,137). 
 
The median difference in PPP-adjusted annual wage earnings by observably equivalent 
workers (35-39 year-old formal-sector urban male wage-earners with 9-12 years of 
schooling, born and educated in each country of origin) is $15,339, from a high of 
$21,000 in Ghana to a low of roughly $5,000 in Dominican Republic.  
 
These ratios are robust to changes in the specification of the underlying regressions. 
Comparing the results using a category of “9-12 years of schooling” to the ratios using 
the Mincer specification in column IV, computing a ratio for each of the years 9 to 12 and 
taking the geometric average produces results with a cross-country correlation of 0.99—
but which are lower on average by about 0.3. 
 
                                                 
13 We also estimate versions of each specification that assume no country-specific coefficients on schooling, which is to 
say that they assume that all coefficients β except β0 are equal to zero. The raw results of these, and those using the 
‘extended’ Mincer specification, are available upon request. 12 
The wage premia tend to be modestly lower at higher levels of education (although this is 
in ratios; in absolute terms the gap grows). This can be attributed mechanically to the fact 
that the partial association of wages in the US labor market and schooling acquired 
abroad (median 6.1% increase in wages per year of schooling) is typically substantially 
lower than the association of US wages and US schooling (median 12.3%) or the 
association of foreign wages and foreign schooling (median 8.2%).  
 
Finally, column V shows estimates of wage ratios that do not control for any observable 
traits at all. Note that these are comparable in order of magnitude to the low-skill 
occupation-specific ratios from Table 1 that do not control for observable worker traits 
besides occupation or industry. Comparing column V with the rest of Table 2 reveals that 
controlling for the observable characteristics of workers accounts for, on average, about 
30-40% percent
14 of the observed cross-national differences in wage ratios. It is not just 
cross-national differences in the quantity and quality of schooling, but also differences in 
average age and in rural-urban residence that account for the explained portion of the 
variance. 
 
Other authors have pooled microdata sets on PPP adjusted income (or consumption 
expenditures) to compute measures of international personal inequality. Milanovic (2008) 
shows that country fixed effects explain roughly 60 percent of all income inequality 
across individuals in the world, but this includes inequality due to differential access to 
capital and different levels of human capital. In contrast, our results are specific to labor 
income for workers with the same characteristics.  
 
These estimates of Ro use regressions simply as a tool for calculating conditional means 
for data description—we are only comparing the distributions of wages of workers in 
given categories (born outside the US, male, urban, aged 35-39, with 9-12 years of 
schooling acquired in the country of origin) on both sides of the border. On this level the 
ratios Ro are just factual summary statistics (ratios of conditional means) that happen to 
be robust to a variety of ways of making adjustments across categories implied in various 
functional forms. As with most empirical work in economics all the theory comes in 
deciding how to interpret these facts, to which we now turn. 
 
                                                 
14 Median 1 – 3.93/6.20 = 0.366; average, 1 – 4.36/7.27 = 0.400. 13 
 
Table 2:  Estimates of the wage ratios of observably equivalent workers (male, urban, 35 years 
old) comparing late arrivers working in the US versus their country of birth at various levels of 
schooling 
Column  I II III IV V  VI 
Specification Category  Category  Category  Mincer 






dollar gain in 
column I 
Average  4.36 4.86 4.15 4.06 7.27  $14,999
Median  3.93 3.87 3.05 3.44 6.20  $15,339
Correlation with col. I  1.00 0.92 0.92 0.99 0.82  ―
Nigeria 13.59  11.97 12.63 11.72 13.45  $18,068
Haiti 11.11  13.76 8.38 10.81 23.50  $18,459
Egypt 9.98  12.60 13.29 8.77 11.98  $19,788
Yemen 8.89  9.03 10.77 8.71 14.07  $18,344
Ghana 8.37  9.21 7.24 7.45 9.37  $21,053
Sierra Leone  7.61  8.80 4.98 7.10 8.35  $19,436
Indonesia 5.82  7.52 5.35 6.09 9.52  $17,971
Cameroon 6.28  6.88 5.78 5.91 10.06  $18,883
Vietnam 5.54  4.66 6.13 5.84 10.29  $16,994
Venezuela 4.86  5.51 5.07 4.91 8.89 $16,337
Pakistan 5.18  4.40 5.61 4.69 12.58  $15,381
India 5.21  5.12 5.96 4.46 10.88  $16,827
Bangladesh 4.92  4.12 3.69 4.45 6.89  $15,031
Ethiopia 4.08  8.65 2.73 4.30 13.08  $17,308
Ecuador (median) 3.87  4.63 3.56 4.15 7.29  $14,520
Jordan 4.82  5.89 4.15 4.10 6.21  $17,643
Cambodia 4.72  3.04 6.92 4.05 9.16  $18,547
Sri Lanka  4.98  3.99 4.21 4.04 9.90  $17,446
Bolivia (median) 3.98  4.52 4.07 3.97 5.78  $16,458
Uganda 4.67  8.89 3.02 3.96 7.71  $17,925
Philippines 3.99  5.74 3.09 3.80 6.18  $16,882
Nepal 4.59  4.52 8.13 3.08 13.48  $14,846
Guyana 2.94  2.58 3.19 2.92 4.81  $16,537
Brazil 2.99  3.75 2.21 2.91 5.03  $15,193
Chile 2.85  3.31 2.36 2.79 3.09  $15,297
Panama 2.94  2.71 2.87 2.77 3.87  $15,084
Jamaica 2.97  3.64 2.48 2.76 3.20  $16,881
Peru 3.11  3.44 2.38 2.73 4.43  $14,248
Thailand 2.37  3.22 1.84 2.50 4.79  $12,992
Turkey 2.16  2.60 2.17 2.46 3.15  $11,814
Uruguay 2.22  2.78 2.05 2.23 3.22  $14,307
Colombia 2.13  2.66 1.93 2.16 4.42  $10,505
Guatemala 2.09  2.47 1.87 2.14 6.25  $10,782
Nicaragua 2.42  2.25 1.88 2.13 4.96  $11,447
Morocco 2.00  1.25 2.01 2.00 3.48  $10,009
Mexico 1.99  2.45 1.60 1.94 3.82  $9,180
South Africa  2.16  2.80 1.40 1.79 2.83 $13,939
Argentina 2.13  2.38 1.85 1.74 2.40  $12,420
Belize 1.53  1.79 1.38 1.69 3.58  $8,597
Paraguay 2.00  1.52 1.31 1.64 3.20  $14,024
Costa Rica  1.56  1.74 1.55 1.61 2.85  $7,548
Dominican Rep. 1.37  1.48 1.38 1.36 3.32  $4,991
 
Sorted in descending order by column IV, for comparability with Table 3. “No controls” means that the regression includes 
only country and wage-unit dummies. “Mincer” is standard Mincer specification. “Category” uses dummies for five 
education levels and nine age levels. Both specifications include interaction terms allowing different returns to schooling 
acquired abroad. The numerator is the predicted wage for “US-born” (US-born US-residents), and the denominator is 
predicted wage for “Foreign-born, late arrival” (foreign-born US-residents who arrived at age 20+).14 
3  Bounding the biases of selection and natural barriers 
 
We wish to know what portion of the ratios Ro is the result of policies that prevent the 
movement of labor. That is, we wish to know Re, the wage ratio for equally productive 
workers who wish to move. Re is the relevant measure because (a) it represents wage 
discrimination as workers would be willing to work at those wages but are prevented 
from doing so by government policy, (b) it is analogous to price gaps across identical 
goods and services induced by borders, and (c) it represents the potential welfare gain to 
the marginal mover if the policy induced costs were removed.  
 
Going back to equation (3), we want to know what portion of Ro represents (i) 
unobservable differences in productivity between selected migrants and non-migrants 
() s δ + 1 , (ii) a compensating differential for “natural” barriers such as credit constraints, 
search costs, distance, language, and unfamiliarity ( ) n δ + 1  to make movers willing to 
move, and (iii) what portion represents the pure wedge introduced by borders ( ) p δ + 1.   
 
No one would claim that 0 = p δ , which would imply that the entire apparatus of control 
of the US border—from visas at airports and border crossings to fences and agents—was 
ineffectual with respect to all countries and workers from all countries are just indifferent 
between moving and staying. This is obviously counter-factual as both high-skill and 
low-skill visas to work in the United States are vastly oversubscribed: the entire stock of 
high-skill temporary “H-1” work visas for all of fiscal year 2008 was famously exhausted 
in a few hours on the first day in 2007 that they became available. The same year, the US 
“diversity visa” lottery drew 6.4 million applications (representing 10 million 
individuals) for 50,000 visas—oversubscribed by a factor of 200 to 1.  
 
Drawing upon economic theory and a range of empirical results in the literature, we 
discuss five separate ways to place useful bounds on the relative contributions of 
selection, natural barriers, and policy: 
 
•  Simulation exercises with a calibrated structural model of selection 
•  A version of our regressions that eliminates selection on unobservables, but must 
be adjusted for international differences in wage-returns to observables 
•  Discussion of the sole extant experimental analysis allowing precise evaluation of 
the wage effect of an exogenous change to  p δ  in isolation 
•  Several migration flows in which policy barriers  p δ  are roughly zero, allowing 
measurement of () () n s δ δ + + 1 1 
•  Comparison with predictions based macroeconomic data, where  0 ≈ s δ  
 
Surprisingly, all of these methods give very similar results. They suggest that the wage 
ratios of observably equivalent workers overestimate wage discrimination and by at most 
a factor of () () 5 . 1 1 1 ≈ + + n s δ δ , resulting in roughly equal measure from selection  s δ  and 
natural barriers  n δ . 15 
  
3.1  A calibrated selection model 
 
The key issue with selection is that, while we have controlled for observables, it may well 
be that Bolivians working in the US would have had higher wages, had they remained in 
Bolivia, than observably equivalent Bolivians who stayed. Thus while we observe that 
our base-case worker earns a monthly wage of $1,831 in the US and $460 in Bolivia, it is 
possible that had the typical Bolivian-born worker in the US been in Bolivia he or she 
would have made more than $460. 
 
Keep in mind, however, the magnitudes at hand. Abstract away from compensating 
differentials for a moment and suppose that the migrant worker is highly selected on 
unobservable traits, and would have been 50 percent more productive than the average 
observably-identical non-migrant. This large difference would only reduce the true wage 
ratio from 3.9 to 2.6. Even if the migrant worker were twice as productive as an 
observably-identical non-migrant the true wage ratio would still be 2.0.  
 
Figure 1 gives another way to get a feel for the limited degree to which selection can 
explain the observed ratios Ro. For four countries of origin—Haiti, Vietnam, Mexico, and 
Ghana—these kernel-density plots show the distribution of the unexplained component of 
wages in the bilateral regressions with the “category” specification. Four groups are 
shown: US-born US-residents ( ij ε δ ˆ ˆ
0 + ), early arrivers ( ij
e
j ε δ δ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 + + ), late arrivers 
( ij
l
j ε δ δ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 + + ) and foreign residents ( ij
r
j ε δ δ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 + + ). 
 
In order for selection to fully explain the wage gap between Vietnam residents and 
Vietnam-born Vietnam-educated US-residents, two conditions must simultaneously be 
met: 1) the typical immigrant from Vietnam must be drawn from the top 1% of the 
distribution of unobserved determinants of earnings in Vietnam or higher, and 2) there 
must be zero or negative correlation between that person’s unobserved component of 
wages in Vietnam and in the United States—that is, this observed characteristic must 
have raised their wages in Vietnam but not in the United States. For Haiti and Mexico, 
similar conditions would need to apply: enormously high positive selection on 
unobservables (top 3-4% of the foreign distribution) and zero or negative correlation of 
































-5 0 5 10
Constant plus residual from ln(wage) regression
USA born, USA res, USA educ VNM born, VNM res, VNM educ































-5 0 5 10
Constant plus residual from ln(wage) regression
USA born, USA res, USA educ HTI born, HTI res, HTI educ































-5 0 5 10
Constant plus residual from ln(wage) regression
USA born, USA res, USA educ MEX born, MEX res, MEX educ
MEX born, USA res, USA educ MEX born, USA res, MEX educ































Economic theory can moreover serve to place bounds on the degree of bias introduced by 
selection. If people move in order to maximize wages subject to an individual-specific 
cost of movement, we can derive the precise degree to which any given relationship 
between the returns to unobservables in foreign and home creates a gap between Ro and 
Re for the new mover in response to a marginal relaxation of migration barriers. We do 





ff i w f ln ≡  represent the wages of a given foreign-born individual in foreign (the 
migrant-origin country), for a given vector of observables x, and let 
i x
i
fh i w h ln ≡  represent 
the wages of the same individual if he or she resides in home (the migrant-destination 
country). Individual i migrates from foreign to home if i i i c f h + ≥ , where  () δ + ≡ 1 ln i c  
where  0 ≥ δ is the cost of moving (broadly considered), expressed in fractions of the 
individual’s foreign wage. 
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Suppose now that each person i with observable traits xi has home and counterfactual 
foreign wages that are jointly normally distributed as ( ) i i h f , π ∼ ( ) ( ) [ ] ρ σ σ , , , , h f h f N  
whereρ  is the correlation. Any level set of this distribution ( )
Π = π h f ,  is an ellipse, as in 
Figure 2. Individuals to the upper left of the line c f h + =  move from foreign to home, 
and the rest do not. The modal new migrant due to an infinitesimal decrease in c is 
represented by the tangent point() m m h f , . Using the equations of the ellipse and 
movement threshold, we can calculate precisely the wage gain to this marginal migrant. 
 
Suppose that the marginal migrant’s US wage hm is observed, but his foreign wage fm is 
not observed and is instead approximated by f , the average for workers in foreign with 
equal observable traits. In this case if the true wage ratio 
m m f h
e e R





− = , with a bias of
f f
e o
m e R R
− = . There are two cases: 
 
No selection or negative selection: Where there is no selection of migrants or negative 
selection on unobserved traits in the foreign market( ) 0 ≤ − f fm , the estimated wage ratio 
underestimates the true ratio. The left-hand panel of Figure 2 shows one such case.  
Recent evidence from Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2008) indicates that Mexican migrants 
to the US are modestly negatively selected on unobserved traits. 
 
Positive selection: Where there is positive selection on unobserved traits( ) 0 > − f fm , as 
in the right-hand panel of Figure 2, the estimated wage ratio overstates the true ratio by 
 
    ( )Θ − =
h h
e o
m e R R  (5) 
 
where  () () ( ) ργ γ ρ γ − − ≡ Θ 1  and  h f σ σ γ ≡ andρ  is the correlation.
15  To begin to 
evaluate the magnitude of bias (5) note that if  1 ≈ γ  (as for three of the four countries in 
Figure 1) then  1 − = Θ  (as long as 1 < ρ ) and  ( ) m h h
e o e R R
− = . At 84 . 0 = γ  (the average γ  
across the countries) and with positive selection overestimation occurs if and only if 
h hm <  and 84 . 0 < ρ . 
 
                                                 
15 Marks (1982) shows that the equation of this ellipse is  Z h a h f b f a = + −
2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , where 
() f f f f σ / ˆ − ≡ ,  () h h h h σ / ˆ − ≡ ,  ( )
2 1 / 1 ρ − ≡ a ,  ( )
2 1 / 2 ρ ρ − ≡ b , and Z is some constant. 
The implicit function theorem yields yields  ( ) ( ) f b h a f a h b f d h d ˆ ˆ 2 ˆ 2 ˆ ˆ / ˆ − − = , which equals 
the slope of the tangent line  h f σ σ γ ≡  at any point ( ) m m h f ,  such that that 
() ( ) γ γ a b b a f h m m 2 2 ˆ ˆ − − = . This implies that for the marginal new migrant, 
( )Θ − = − h h f f m m , where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ργ γ ρ γ γ γ γ − − = − − ≡ Θ 1 2 2
2 b a a b . 18 
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We can therefore assess the magnitude of the bias  e o R R  if we can place bounds on 
h hm − , the gap between the destination-country (US) wage of the marginal migrant and 
the destination-country wage of the average observably identical person from foreign. 
This is easy under one assumption: that the average expected difference between the 
unobservable component of worker productivity is zero across countries. That is, suppose 
that there is no unobserved trait (such as “culture”) that makes a randomly-selected 
worker from any one country less productive than a randomly-selected worker from any 
other country, when both work in the same market and both have equal training, 
schooling quality, experience, and so on. This allows us to approximate h —the 
(unobservable) wage that the average, randomly-selected foreign-born person would earn 
in home conditional on observed traits—as the average wage that a home-born person 
earns in home conditional on observed traits. If this is so, then the gap between the 
observed residual wage (after controlling for observables) of foreign-born in the 
destination country ( ) ij
l
j ε δ δ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 + +  and that of the native-born ( ) ij ε δ ˆ ˆ
0 +  can proxy for the 
gap between the residual wage of the actual migrants ( ) m h  and what the wage of a 
randomly-selected person from the migrant-sending country would be( ) h . 
 
In our sample the simple average of 
l
j δ ˆ  across all countries j is –0.17 in the standard 
Mincer specification and –0.21 in the ‘category’ specification. Suppose 





Π = π h f ,  
m h  
m f  
o R ln  
e R ln  





Π = π h f ,  
m h  
m f  
o R ln   e R ln  19 
that 21 . 0 − ≈ −h hm . Assuming  5 . 0 = ρ  and 84 . 0 = γ , then  49 . 0 − = Θ  and the bias in (5) 
is  11 . 1 ≈ e o R R .  
 
Note that this implies  = − f fm 0.10, and if  1 ≈ f σ  then migrants are being drawn from 
the 54
th percentile of the foreign distribution of unobserved traits, while the worth of 
those unobserved traits in home is only in the 42
nd percentile of the home-value of the 
unobserved traits of all people in foreign. Alternative assumptions on ρ make little 
difference. The highest bias at any correlation ρ is 1.2 when ρ = –1, with the implausible 
assumption that the observed characteristics that raise wages in the foreign country are 
perfectly negatively correlated with those that raise wages in the US.
16 
 
3.2  Pooled regressions and the randomly-selected migrant 
 
There is a second, completely different way of assessing the impact of selection. We can 
directly estimate wage ratios purged of selection effects under a different set of 
assumptions. Recall the estimation problem (1), which we solved with a set of 
assumptions A1. If we accept for a moment the strong assumption that observable worker 
traits have similar returns across countries, we are not far from a different solution to the 
selection problem. Suppose that we return to equation (1) and adopt a different set of 
assumptions, A2: 
 
•  that the schooling and other traits of people from foreign residing in home have 
the same association with wages as they do for people from home residing in 




fh x x θ θ = ; 
•  that the mean unobservable contribution to wages does not differ across countries 




fh x E x E ′ = ′ φ φ ; 
•  that the partial association of wages and unobservable traits in foreign is 
independent of the same association in home 








fh x E x E x x E ′ ′ = ′ ′ φ φ φ φ / / ; 
•  and that migration is costless to the migrant. 
 
Now, equation (1) reduces to 
 
    ( )
() x
x





= ≡ ] | [ | 2 2 . (6) 
 
The right-hand side of (6) is observable. The result is an estimate of the ratio of wages 
after and before migration of a person with observed traits x in foreign who is randomly 
selected and obliged to migrate. It has the advantage of being unaffected by selection (by 
definition). It has the disadvantage of making the strong assumption that returns to 
                                                 
16 Given  21 . 0 − = −h hm , then if ρ = 0.3 the selection bias in the observed ratios is 1.14. If ρ = 0.7 the bias is 1.06; 
if ρ = 0 the bias is 1.16; if ρ = –0.5 the bias is 1.18. 20 
observable traits x do not depend on the origin of those traits; for example, a year of 
additional schooling acquired in Ghana is rewarded in the US labor market by the same 
amount as a year of additional schooling acquired in the US. It has the further 
disadvantage of assuming costless migration. Below we will relax these counterfactually 
strong assumptions on the returns to schooling and, later, migration costs. 
 
3.2.1  No adjustment for schooling quality 
 
To estimate equation (6) we combine in a single sample all individuals residing in the US 
and in all countries j ∈ J, where J is the set of all countries besides the US, and estimate 
the regression equation 
 






























0 0 . (7) 
 
Just as before, mutatis mutandis, we run three different specifications of (7): a basic 
Mincer version, and “extended” Mincer version with quadratic and cubic terms, and a 
“category” version with indicator variables for levels of schooling and age. But whereas 
regression (4) was run with only individuals from the US and one other country at a time, 
regression (7) is run with all individuals from the US and all other countries at once. 
 
From these pooled estimates we calculate the ratio of the expected wage of a randomly-
selected individual with s years of education residing in the US to the expected wage of 
the same person residing in country j as 
 






β δ ˆ ˆ
,






j β δ ˆ , ˆ  are empirical estimates of the corresponding parameters. Table 3 presents 
estimates of (8). The first column reproduces the bilateral estimates of  j o R , ˆ from column 
IV of Table 2 for comparison. The second column shows pooled estimates of  j o R ,
~
 based 
on the ‘category’ specification, and the third column shows pooled estimates of  j o R ,
~
 
based on the basic Mincer specification. The agreement between the columns is close. 21 
Table 3: Wage ratios from pooled regressions 
 
Column  I II  III 
Sample  Bilateral Pooled  Pooled 
Specification  Mincer Category  Mincer 
Schooling  Avg. 9-12  9-12  Avg. 9-12 
Average  4.06 4.92  4.38
Median  3.44 4.20  3.74
Correlation with col. I  ― 0.98  0.99
Nigeria 11.72  14.41  12.39
Haiti 10.81  13.51  11.92
Egypt 8.77  10.12  8.69
Yemen 8.71  9.47  9.28
Ghana 7.45  10.40  8.70
Sierra Leone  7.10  7.24  7.18
Indonesia 6.09  6.69  6.12
Cameroon 5.91  7.04  5.93
Vietnam 5.84  5.94  5.72
Venezuela 4.91  6.28  5.69
Pakistan 4.69  6.31  6.07
India 4.46  5.49  4.51
Bangladesh 4.45  5.84  5.19
Ethiopia 4.30  6.50  4.62
Ecuador 4.15  5.28  4.75
Jordan 4.10  5.54  4.91
Cambodia 4.05  3.80  4.20
Sri Lanka  4.04  5.41  4.69
Bolivia 3.97  4.68  4.16
Uganda 3.96  4.86  3.77
Philippines 3.80  4.36  3.71
Nepal 3.08  4.56  4.18
Guyana 2.92  2.76  2.82
Brazil 2.91  3.36  2.96
Chile 2.79  2.92  2.78
Panama 2.77  3.28  3.01
Jamaica 2.76  3.21  2.88
Peru 2.73  4.03  3.38
Thailand 2.50  2.88  2.42
Turkey 2.46  2.42  2.45
Uruguay 2.23  2.42  2.19
Colombia 2.16  2.89  2.54
Guatemala 2.14  2.81  2.51
Nicaragua 2.13  3.01  2.63
Morocco 2.00  2.49  2.21
Mexico 1.94  2.79  2.32
South Africa  1.79  2.10  1.70
Argentina 1.74  1.78  1.71
Belize 1.69  1.84  1.70
Paraguay 1.64  1.95  1.75
Costa Rica  1.61  1.94  1.72
Dominican Rep.  1.36  1.94  1.82
 
Col. 1 reproduces Table 2, col. 4 for comparison. Results are for 35 year-old urban male formal-sector wage earners. 
“Mincer” is standard Mincer specification. “Category” uses dummies for five education levels and nine age levels. 
Columns I and III show, for each country, the geometric average of the ratios obtained for 9, 10, 11, and 12 years of 
education. 22 
As a means of bounding the bias due to selection, these raw results are no help. The 
predicted wage ratios from pooled regressions in Table 3—which are unaffected by 
selection—are frequently higher than the earlier estimates of Table 2 (the median is 
higher by 0.3). We might expect the opposite if the bilateral regressions comparing actual 
migrants were biased upward by selection. A natural candidate for the cause of that 
anomaly is that the pooled regression wage ratios are premised on the assumption that s 
years of schooling acquired in a foreign country are worth exactly the same amount in the 
US labor market as s years acquired in the US, to which we now turn. 
 
3.2.2  With adjustment for schooling quality 
 
To calculate wage ratios that relax this strong assumption requires some measure of the 
difference between the US labor market value of schooling acquired in the US and 
schooling acquired abroad. We perform two calculations, one based on differences in 
international standardized test scores and one based on the estimates in the bilateral 
regressions.  
 
A first cut is to assume that years of schooling that produced equal skills would produce 
equal returns (even if assessed in the native language). Hanushek and Woessman 
(Forthcoming) construct an internationally-comparable measure of learning achievement 
acquired by eighth-grade students in 50 countries, by transforming any available 
internationally-standardized math and science examination score for a country into a 
single measure and then averaging those measures into an omnibus achievement score 
with mean 500. We transform that score into a “years of equivalent schooling” to the US 
by taking the difference between the foreign score and the US score and dividing by an 
assumed US annual learning gain of 40 score points per year (based on the comparisons 
of equal aged students in eighth or ninth grades on the PISA examination). For instance, 
the quality score for Argentina is 392 and for the US is 490, so the achievement-adjusted 
years equivalent deficit is (490–392)/40 = 2.45, and an Argentine with 9 years of 
schooling working in the US would be predicted to have wages in the US equivalent to a 
US worker with 6.55 years. 
 
For the 17 countries that are both in our sample and have scores from Hanushek and 
Woessman (Forthcoming), the average (median) years-equivalent deficit is 2.39 (2.18).
17  
We then use the pooled coefficient estimates to calculate the wage ratios for each country 
based on the assumption that in the US labor market a year of schooling acquired abroad 
is valued only as an achievement-adjusted year. The top panel of Table 4 shows the 
results. If the entire difference between  o R ˆ  and  o R
~
 were due to the selection of migrants 
then this bias would be 1.25 to 1.34. 
 
                                                 
17 This accords well with the finding by Bratsberg and Ragan Jr. (2002) (Fig. 3) that immigrants to the US with 9 or 
more years of education acquired abroad have roughly the same earnings on average as US-educated immigrants who 
have two years less education but are otherwise observably identical (the gap disappears below 9 years of education). 
They find that this effect is not due to language differences or to the effect of arriving earlier and growing up in the US, 
but primarily to either superior skill acquisition or superior skill certification in US schools compared to foreign 
schools, for the US labor market. 23 
The first method assumes that all of the difference in impact of schooling on wages is 
associated with measures of learning achievement. A second method uses our own 
empirical estimates of the wage increment from schooling acquired abroad in the US 
labor market versus that of a year acquired in the US, from the bilateral regressions. This 
includes not just “quality” in the sense of learning achievement but also relevance to the 
US labor market and US-specific signaling effects. Averaged over all bilateral 
regressions the coefficient on s of US residents is  123 . 0 0 ≡ β , for foreign-born US 
residents who arrived before age 20 (some of whom acquired schooling in the US) it is 
106 . 0 =
e
j β , and for foreign-born US residents who arrived at or after age 20 the 
coefficient is  065 . 0 =
l
j β .
18  We calculate wage ratios using the pooled regression 
coefficients but compare a US worker with 9 years of schooling to a foreign worker with 
( ) 0 9 β β
l
j s × =  to account for the “evaporation” of schooling in the move from foreign to 
the US. The middle panel of Table 4 shows this calculation. Again, if we interpret the 
excess of the wage ratios of observably equivalent actual migrants to the wage ratios of 
observably equivalent non-migrants to selection effects the effect is somewhere between 
1.65 and 1.72. 
 
Finally we ask the question of how many years of foreign-acquired schooling would have 
to “evaporate” when an immigrant arrives in the US to make the estimates for wage gains 
to the randomly-selected migrant (pooled regressions) accord with those for the marginal 
migrant (bilateral regressions) at a given degree of selection of the marginal migrant. 
Given the above estimates that an immigrant with nine years of education experiences the 
“evaporation” of roughly two years of schooling, an evaporation fraction of 0.2-0.3 is 
reasonable. This suggests that selection biases the bilateral estimates of the wage ratios 
relative to the quality adjusted pooled regressions (with no selection) upwards by a factor 
of between 1.2 and 1.3. 
 
                                                 
18 We get similar results with the bilateral regressions using educational categories, the ratio of the coefficient for 
immigrant late arrivers to that of the US for those with 9 to 12 years of schooling is 0.49. 24 
Table 4: Adjusting the estimates of wage ratios of observably equivalent workers 
from pooled regressions adjusting for the quality of schooling 
 
(a) Adjustment using Internationally Comparable Assessments of Learning Achievement 
Row   Average, 
N = 18 
Median, 
N = 18 
I  Wage ratios, bilateral regressions, basic Mincer, S=9  4.66  3.03
II  Unadjusted wage ratios, pooled regressions, basic Mincer, S=9  4.13  2.63
III  Wage ratios, pooled regressions, schooling in US in test score 
adjusted years equivalent  3.08 2.11
IV  Ratio row I / row III  1.34 1.25
V  Number of score adjusted years equivalent of schooling that 
foreign is less than that of the US  2.39 2.18
 
(b) Adjustment using differences in returns in the US labor market of schooling acquired in the US 
and abroad 
Row   Average, 
N = 42 
Median, 
N = 42 
I  Wage ratios, bilateral regressions, basic Mincer, S=9  4.10  3.59
II  Unadjusted wage ratios, pooled regressions, basic Mincer, S=9  4.09  3.75
III  Wage ratios, pooled regressions, schooling of migrants in US 
scaled back by β
l
j/β0   2.47 2.18
IV  Ratio row I / row III  1.65 1.65
V  Ratio of Mincer coefficient for years acquired in foreign country 
versus US, β
l
j/β0  0.533 0.495
 
(c) Adjustment using a hypothetical "evaporation" ratio  
Row   Median,  N = 42 
I  Wage ratios, bilateral regressions, 
basic Mincer, s = 9  3.59 3.59 3.59 3.59 3.59  3.59
II  Unadjusted wage ratios, pooled 
regressions, basic Mincer, s = 9  – – – –  –  – 
III  Wage ratios, schooling in US labor 
market scaled by (1 – evaporation 
ratio) 
3.75 3.37 3.02 2.71 2.44  2.19
IV  Ratio row I / row III  0.96 1.07 1.19 1.32 1.47  1.64
V  Assumed fraction of a year of 
schooling acquired abroad that 
“evaporates” in US labor market 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4  0.5
 
3.3  Natural experiments 
 
A third way to bound the bias is to rely on natural experiments that permit identification 
of the wage gain from migration per se. McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2006) present 
a unique experimental estimate of the wage gain to migration from a poor to a rich 
country. They take advantage of New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category residence visa, 
which is designed to allow a limited number of citizens of Tonga (and three other island 
states) to settle in New Zealand each year via a random lottery. Any person age 18-45 
who is a citizen and natural of the four PAC countries may register for the lottery, and 
among those registered a certain number are randomly allocated the chance to apply for 
residence. Though not all lottery winners later acquire New Zealand residence, a survey 
comparing the wages of Tongan lottery losers with those of Tongan lottery winners 25 
allows calculation of an intent-to-treat effect, which in turn allows isolation of the pure 
effect of movement on wages. 
 
In the sample of McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2006), the mean weekly income of 
Tongan non-applicants to the lottery is NZ$70. The OLS estimate of the income gain to 
migration—which controls only for education, age, sex, height, and birth on Tonga’s 
principal island—is NZ$360 per week. The experimental estimate is NZ$274. 
Controlling for observables, then, the wage ratio Ro is (70+360)/70 = 6.14, while the true 
wage ratio Re controlling for both observables and unobservables is (70+274)/70 = 4.91. 
In other words, the predicted wage ratios of observational equivalent workers overstates 
the true ratio of selected movers by a factor of 6.14/4.91 = 1.25.  
 
While currently there are no other estimates from policy-induced migration channels free 
of selection, there is evidence comparing destination-country incomes among migrant 
streams that plausibly differ in their basis and degree of selection. Cortes (2004) finds 
that refugees who arrived in the US between 1975 and 1980 had 6% lower earnings in 
1980 than economic migrants who arrived in the same period—controlling for education, 
age, language ability, marital status, and region of residence. If indeed the unobserved 
traits x′ of migrants differ systematically from the true unobserved traits  r x′ of non-
migrants, then estimates of Re based on (3) are biased by  ( ) [ ] () [ ] r fh fh x E x E ′ ′ φ φ ˆ ˆ . The more 
refugees’ unobservable determinants of earnings resemble those of the average non-
migrant, the more closely this bias term is approximated by the Cortes (2004) finding of 
1/(1–0.06) = 1.064. This means that either (i) if refugees are much less positively selected 
on unobservables than other migrants, then the selection bias in our estimates of Re is not 
large, and is not far above 1.1, or (ii) refugees are selected on unobservables as much as 
other migrants, in which case their earnings relative to other migrants are not informative 
about the degree of bias that selection produces in our estimates.
19 
 
3.4  Bounding the effects of natural barriers 
 
The wage ratio Re measures the wedge between an individual’s wages after and before 
migration, and reflects the cost of moving. As in equation (1), part of this cost we term 
“natural” ( n δ )—which is to say largely independent of government policy—such as 
transportation expenses, psychic costs of an unfamiliar environment, costs of language 
acquisition, and so on. The rest is the policy-induced cost of moving ( p δ ). 
 
                                                 
19 Cortes (2004) also finds that by 1990, the same refugee cohort had 20% higher earnings than economic migrants, 
controlling for the same observable traits. Measured at this time-point, then, if refugees are much less positively 
selected on unobservables than economic migrants, our wage ratios are not only overestimated to a small degree—they 
are underestimated. 26 
Table 5: PPP wage ratios for urban males between continental US and Puerto Rico, and 
between US states 
 
Sample  Pooled Pooled Pooled Bilateral  Bilateral 
Specification  Mincer Mincer Category  Category  Category 
Years of education  9  9  9-12  9-12  9-12 
Age  35 35 35-39  35-39  35-39 
State-specific  educ.?  N Y N Y Y 
Comparison     US-born  PR-born 
       
Puerto Rico  1.51 1.31 1.56 1.75  1.50
   
48 US States, base group New York 
   Average  0.97 0.87 0.97  
   Median  0.95 0.86 0.96  
   Standard deviation  0.08 0.08 0.07  
   Maximum  1.15 1.02 1.15  
   Minimum  0.84 0.74 0.85  
   Max./Min.  1.37 1.37 1.35  
 
The maximum states are North Dakota (cols. 1 & 3) and Rhode Island (col. 2); the minimum states are Texas (cols. 1 & 3) 
and Mississippi (col. 2). “Basic” means standard Mincer specification with linear education term and linear + quadratic age 
terms. “Category” means dummies for five education levels and nine age levels. “State-spec ed” means the education 
terms are allowed to differ in each state. The Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2000) US state cost-of-living index does not 
include estimates for Alaska, Hawaii, or the District of Columbia, so no comparable PPP wages can be calculated for 
those. New York is the base group in the regressions. “US born” column is the ratio of wages for US-born, US residents to 
those Puerto Rico-born Puerto Rico residents. The “PR born” column shows the ratio of wages for Puerto Rico-born US 
residents to Puerto Rico-born Puerto Rico residents. Sample is roughly 1.6 million people, all regressions weighted with 
sampling weights. 
 
What portion of the ratios in Table 2 can be explained by natural costs n δ ?  We approach 
this question by estimating equation (1) in settings where there are few legal barriers to 
movement, so that 0 ≈ p δ : migration within countries, and movement from Puerto Rico 
and Micronesia to the United States. 
 
Table 5 presents estimates of  o R ˆ  and  o R
~
 for workers in New York to those in 47 other 
continental US states and Puerto Rico, using regressions similarly structured to those 
underlying Table 2.
20  The earnings of observably identical workers across US states 
differ by a ratio of 1.35-1.37 at the extremes, which is not surprising given the spatially 
integrated labor market.  
 
The earnings of workers born in Puerto Rico but residing in New York state are about 1.5 
times the earnings of observably identical residents of Puerto Rico born in Puerto Rico. 
This ratio combines the effect of natural barriers  n δ  and any bias to the ratio (2) from 
                                                 
20 Dollar wages in Puerto Rico are converted to “mainland PPP” dollars by dividing by the PPP factor 0.86 from 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). The census data do not contain year of arrival on the mainland for people born in 
Puerto Rico, so for these regressions we combine “early” and “late” arrivals in (6) into a single category. Dollar wages 
in each of the US states are standardized for purchasing power based on the state cost-of-living estimates by Berry, 
Fording, and Hanson (2000). Only 48 states are estimated because the cost-of-living estimates used to standardize 
wages by purchasing power are missing for Alaska and Hawaii (and the District of Columbia). The state of New York 
is used as the base group. 27 
selection of emigrants. This suggests that a reasonable upper bound on () () s n δ δ + + 1 1 f o r  
a non-English-speaking country close to the United States is 1.5. 
 
These results for US states accord well with domestic rural-urban wage gaps for 
observably identical workers within all 43 developing countries we study. The coefficient 
on the “rural” dummy in the pooled regressions of Section 3.2 is approximately –0.3. 
This suggests that the average ratio of an urban worker’s wages to those of an otherwise 
observably identical rural worker is about 1.4 across all these countries on average. Such 
a wedge reflects the combined effect of natural barriers and selection( )( ) s n δ δ + + 1 1.  I n  
spatially integrated labor markets, movement itself places bounds on how high this 
wedge can rise. 
 
There is another, less-studied case of a developing country facing no migration barrier 
from the US. Since 1986, any citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) can 
acquire on demand a US work visa of unlimited duration. Akee (2007b) presents linked 
microdata on 632 individuals who were in FSM at the time of the 1994 census and had 
migrated to the United States by the time of the Micronesian Immigrant Survey of Hawaii 
and Guam in 1997. Many people in the sample were self-employed or unemployed prior 
to migration, and only 92 report wage income before and after migration. Mean annual 
pre-migration earnings are roughly US$4,000 and mean annual post-migration earnings 
are roughly US$8,000.
21 Using the PPP deflator of 0.51 for FSM with respect to the US 
as a whole (Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006)), purchasing power-adjusted wages 
would be roughly the same before and after migration. But group housing arrangements, 
food choices, and other strategies allow recently-arrived FSM migrants to live at 
somewhat less than the typical cost of living for full US citizens, suggesting that the ratio 
representing their true real wage gain to migration is likely to be in the range of 1.1 to 
1.4. Note that in this case the same individuals are being followed across the border, so 
selection bias 0 = s δ . 
 
In other words, the FSM and US labor markets are moderately well-integrated in wage 
terms, and  n δ  is likely to be in the range of 0.1 to 0.4. The sample is quite small so this 
estimate cannot be treated as exact, but it has the advantage of being entirely free of 
selection effects and therefore a pure estimate of natural barriers aside from those related 
to language differences. It suggests that for a middle-income developing country whose 
official language is English,  n δ  can be low despite substantial transportation costs. 
 
Prior to 1917, Italians faced only minimal legal restrictions to enter and work in the US. 
Hatton and Williamson (2005) pp. 53-55 show that in the period 1880-1900, real 
unskilled urban wages were roughly 2.5 times larger in the United States than in Italy, a 
disequilibrium phenomenon that helped to spark an enormous emigration of Italians as 
the real cost of transportation plummeted. Roughly 25% of the population departed 
between 1870 and 1920. Before major legal barriers to Italian and other immigration 
                                                 
21 Wage and price information in personal communication from the author. These data only capture a relatively short 
window of experience in the destination (less than two years) and wages may increase over a longer time period. 28 
were raised during 1918-1924, this flood had already slowed dramatically and return 
migration had soared as the wage ratio descended to about 1.5 (Williamson (1997), Fig. 
6). This suggests () () 5 . 1 1 1 ≈ + + s n δ δ  as a plausible estimate for a developing country 
facing moderate distance and language barriers. 
 
3.5  Corroboration with macroeconomic evidence 
 
A final way of assessing the bias induced by selection of migrants is to compare our 
individual based estimates with aggregate estimates. A basic question in the economic 
growth literature is how much of the observed income differentials across countries are 
due to differences in the accumulation of factors—physical and human capital versus 
country specific productivity. There are two important implications of this literature for 
our results.  
 
First, if our wage ratios comparing observably equivalent worker estimates are biased 
upward by the positive selection of migrants, then one would expect our estimates to be 
typically much higher than the macroeconomic estimates of the relative productivities of 
labor with equal human capital, which are much less subject to this bias. Hall and Jones 
(1998) and Hall and Jones (1999) estimate a decomposition of countries’ relative output 
per worker relative to the US into physical capital stocks, human capital, and country 
specific productivity. The agreement is striking between our wage ratio Ro and the Hall 
and Jones growth accounting estimates of the relative marginal product of human capital 
equivalent workers for the 37 countries which have both. For these countries our median 
wage ratio estimate is 3.11 (‘category’ specification) or 2.92 (Mincer specification, 
geometric average of 9 to 12 years of schooling). The estimates of the ratio of marginal 
products of human capital adjusted labor from Hall and Jones (1999) is 3.07. 
 
This close general agreement across 37 countries, both in mean and correlation is 
particularly striking as they are calculated by completely unrelated methods from 
unrelated data.
22  This suggests, once again and via independent evidence, that there can 
only be a limited degree to which our estimates of Ro are biased upward relative to Re by 
the positive selection of migrants. Our numbers also agree closely with those of 
Hendricks (2002), who finds that even after controlling for cross-country differences in 
physical capital and both observable and unobservable human capital, GDP per capita in 
the United States is three times higher than in the average low-income country; it is eight 
times higher than in the poorest countries.
23  
 
                                                 
22 The raw correlation between the two estimates is 0.5, but this is driven by a relatively small set of countries for 
which the estimates diverge substantially. If one drops Uganda, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt and Venezuela—all of which 
have very large informal sectors that our estimates omit—the correlation is 0.8. 
23 Hendricks (2002) compares earnings of observably identical workers from different countries in the United States to 
estimate the unobservable portion of human capital across countries, but his analysis is otherwise macroeconomic. 29 
Table 6:  Comparison of estimated wage ratios of observably equivalent workers to 
Hall and Jones growth accounting estimates of the relative marginal product of 
human capital adjusted labor for 37 countries 
 




I  Bilateral, regressions with education categories  3.11 4.39 4.04
II  Bilat. Mincer regressions geometric avg. of years, 9-12  2.92 4.10  3.79
III  Ratios of marginal product of human capital equivalent 
labor, US to country  3.07 3.69  3.66
IV  Ratio of United States A to country A 2.44 2.71  2.86
V  Ratio of row I (preferred Ro estimate) to row III (growth 
accounting estimate)  1.01 1.19 1.11
VI  Proportion of cross-national difference in human capital 
adjusted labor due to differences in A (ratio IV to III)  0.80 0.74  0.78
 
Sources:  Author’s calculations and Hall and Jones (1998) (Table 7), Hall and Jones (1999). 
 
A second important implication of these results is that the large majority of the cross-
national gap in marginal products of workers with equivalent human capital is due to 
productivity differences, not physical capital. This has consequences for the expected 
welfare gains of migration for people in the destination country: If the differences are 
mostly productivity (“A”) and country-specific “A” is a pure public good, then there is 
little “factor shallowing” effect of reducing wages for all existing workers by lowering 
the capital-labor ratio with labor inflows. 
 
In fact, row IV of table 5 shows that the typical ratio of factor productivities (A) is 2.44, 
which is roughly 80 percent of the observed wage (or marginal product) ratio. Caselli 
(2005) reviews the literature on growth decompositions and shows that, in the standard 
models, it is typical for physical and human capital differences to account for less than 50 
percent of differences in per-worker output. As Easterly (2004) points out, in 
“productivity world,” factors move to higher productivity locations, as opposed to “factor 
world,” in which places with scarce factors attract more factors. In “productivity world” 
the gains to movers are not offset by losses to existing residents. 
 
4  Comparison with other literature 
 
The preceding section gives us the tools to plausibly estimate what fraction of the wage 
gaps we measure can be attributed to wage discrimination. We can then compare wage 
discrimination at the border to other forms of wage discrimination that have been 
observed in different labor markets. We go on to compare international price gaps for 
labor to those in goods and factor markets. Finally, we compare the potential gains from 
migration to other forms of poverty reduction policies or programs.  
 
4.1  Comparison with other forms of wage discrimination  
 
The diverse evidence reviewed in the previous section is notably consistent: Each piece 
suggests that the measured ratios (3) in Table 2 overstate the true ratio by a factor of 30 
roughly 1.5 or less, due to a combination of selection bias and natural barriers. The 
remaining portions of these ratios, that attributable to pure border effects  p δ + 1 , are very 
large for many countries. This suggests, for example, that of the median wage ratio of 
3.92 unexplained by observable characteristics, roughly a ratio of 2.6 constitutes a pure 
border effect. Here we compare these gaps, by definition a form of wage discrimination, 
to other forms of discrimination within countries. 
 
By “wage discrimination” we mean any labor market force that causes workers of equal 
intrinsic productivity involuntarily to receive different wages because of socially 
constructed characteristics of the workers.  Barriers to the movement of workers across 
international borders create wage discrimination of precisely this kind. Suppose a given 
worker has a higher realized productivity in the United States than in Bolivia—due to the 
institutions, technologies, and other complementary inputs available in the United 
States—and therefore earns higher wages in the United States. Any policy that limits the 
realized productivity of that worker, by limiting access to the United States and its 
complementary inputs, obliges that person to accept a lower wage than he or she could 
potentially realize. This is wage discrimination based on a socially-constructed trait, 
workers’ country of their birth. While in common usage “discrimination” and “prejudice” 
have become synonymous, no American need feel toward that worker any distaste or 
prejudice, racial or otherwise, in order to produce this result.
24 
 
We begin with a comparison of sex discrimination to country-of-birth discrimination, 
using only information internal to our dataset. We perform threefold Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions for each of the 42 developing countries under study.
25  These estimate 
what portion of the average difference of some variable between two groups is due to 
differences in observable characteristics, what portion is due to differences in the 
coefficients on those characteristics, and what portion is due to differences in the 
interaction between coefficients and characteristics. The bars in the top pane of Figure 3 
show the mean difference between ln(wage) between residents of each country and 
observably identical US-residents who were born and educated in that country.
26  The 
dark area of each bar shows the portion that is due to differences in coefficients on 
observable traits, while the light area of the bar shows the portion that is due to either 
differences in observable traits or the interaction of observable traits and coefficients.
27  
In general the large majority of wage gaps across the border are not explained by 
differences in observed characteristics. 
                                                 
24 Some might question the use of the term “discrimination” for international differences. The foundational model of 
labor market discrimination by Becker (1971) (p. 35) actually begins—for conceptual clarity—as a model of labor 
migration from a black ‘country’ to a white ‘country’, and only later comes to represent racial discrimination in a single 
spatially integrated market by analogy. Becker defines wage discrimination as cross-group differences in wages 
unrelated to worker productivity, which is precisely what we seek here. He notes that “treating discrimination as a 
problem in trade and migration is far from artificial, since they are closely and profoundly related”.   
25 We use the threefold decomposition of Winsborough and Dickenson (1971), closely related to the decomposition of 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). 
26 These decompositions use the “category” regression specification with country-specific coefficients on schooling. 
The results are similar for the Mincer specification. 
27 For the present purpose this rendering is conservative, as only the portion completely attributable to differences in 
coefficients is represented by the dark area. The light area includes the portion attributable to the interaction between 
differences in coefficients and differences in observable traits, which includes some portion of the gap attributable to 
differences in coefficients. 31 
Figure 3: Comparing unexplained international wage gaps with unexplained sex 
wage gaps domestically, with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
 
 
(a) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of foreign-born, foreign-educated, by residence in US 
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Threefold decompositions where “Rest” contains both differences in observed traits and the interaction term. 32 
The lower pane of Figure 3 shows a strictly domestic decomposition of the gap between 
male and female wages for residents of each country, but is otherwise identical to the 
cross-border decomposition above. Even corrected for the greatest plausible degree of 
selection and natural wedges in the cross-border wage gaps, the degree of unexplained 
difference in wages across international borders is—for every country in the sample—
dramatically greater than male-female wage gaps within countries unexplained by 
observables. Wage discrimination across the border generally exceeds sex discrimination 
within borders by an order of magnitude. 
 
In the United States, the ratio of wages of males to those of observably identical females 
who are in the workforce is about 1.3.
28  In our sample of 42 developing countries the 
median domestic ratio of wages of males to observably equivalent females is 1.4 
(Madagascar), a large magnitude of which explains the justifiable widespread concern 
about sex and gender discrimination. But for 35 of the 42 countries, estimated border 
discrimination estimates, Re, exceeds the estimate of domestic gender discrimination. In 
our sample the highest the ratio of wages of men to observably equivalent identical 
women is, perhaps not surprisingly, in Pakistan: a ratio of 3.1. For 17 of the countries we 
study, the effect of the US border  5 . 1 / o e R R ≈  exceeds the most egregious estimated 
gender discrimination.   
 
The literature contains several regressions exploring wage gaps between workers that are 
observably identical except for their ethnicity, within spatially integrated labor markets.  
These have included measures of the gaps for black workers in the United States, 
scheduled castes/scheduled tribes in India, indigenous Malaysians, Indigenous 
Tanzanians, and indigenous Bolivians.
29  All of these reveal that wages in the base group 
exceed wages in the group discriminated against by a factor of 1.1–1.9 unexplained by 
characteristics. For example, the ratio of a white man’s wages to those of an observably 




Table 7 summarizes all of this evidence on past and present domestic wage 
discrimination, and contrasts it with our estimates of wage discrimination across borders. 
                                                 
28 Altonji and Blank (1999) (Table 1, column 2) show that ln mean hourly wage for a full-year, full-time employed 
white male in 1995 is ln(17.97) = 2.89. The coefficient on female in Table 4, column 6 is –0.241, suggesting the ln 
mean hourly wage for an otherwise observably identical woman is 14.12, and 17.97/14.12 = 1.27 
29 Banerjee and Knight (1991) report that in survey data collected in Delhi from October 1975 to April 1976, 
observably identical Indians who were not members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) earned 10.9% 
more than members of SC/STs (p. 185). Knight and Sabot (1991) find that in a survey of 1,000 urban Tanzanian firms 
in 1971, people who were not indigenous Africans (almost all of Asian ancestry) earned 87% more than observably 
identical indigenous Africans (p. 65). The Mincer wage regressions of Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1993) (p. 305) 
indicate that a 28% wage deficit for indigenous workers relative to other workers is unexplained by differences in 
observable characteristics, thus 1/(1–0.28) = 1.39. Schafgans (1998) (p. 483) finds a maximum differential in wages 
between Chinese and Malay males unexplained by observables of 27%, thus 1/(1–0.27) = 1.37. 
30 Altonji and Blank (1999) (Table 1, column 2) show that ln mean hourly wage for a full-year, full-time employed 
white male in 1995 is ln(17.97) = 2.89. The coefficient on black is –0.067, suggesting that ln mean hourly wage for an 
otherwise observably identical black male is 16.81, and 17.97/16.81 = 1.07. Chandra (2000) documents the substantial 
narrowing of the black-white wage gap between 1940 and 1990, and Heckman, Lyons, and Todd (2000) suggest that 
some substantial portion of the narrowing during this period remains unexplained by changes in observable 
characteristics other than race. Sundstrom (2007) (p. 412) conducts Mincer regressions using the 1940 US census and 
finds a black-white wage gap of 36% unexplained by observable characteristics in 1939 wages. 33 
The first column compiles various estimates of wage discrimination within countries. The 
second column summarizes the measured effects of natural barriers and selection on 
wage gaps in the absence of policy barriers to movement, discussed in Section 3.4. The 
third column gives our estimate of Re, the pure border effect on the wage ratio. The fourth 
column gives the estimates of Ro—wage ratios for observably equivalent workers—from 
Table 2. The estimates in column 3, with the exception of the McKenzie, Gibson, and 
Stillman (2006) experimental estimate, are calculated by dividing the values in column 4 
by 1.5. Figure 4 summarizes the same information graphically. 
 
The key lesson of Table 7 is that the wage discrimination created by international borders 
is, for large numbers of developing countries, at least as large as any current form of 
wage discrimination against socially disfavored groups within spatially integrated labor 
markets. For many of the 42 developing countries we investigate, it is much larger. For 
several countries—including Nigeria, Haiti, Egypt, and Ghana—the US border effect on 
the wages of equal intrinsic productivity workers is greater than any form of wage 
discrimination (gender, race, or ethnicity) that has ever been measured.
31 
 
4.2  Comparison with other border-induced price wedges 
 
Empirical economics has frequently commented on the fact that borders introduce large 
wedges in the price of labor between countries. O'Rourke and Williamson (2000) (p. 155) 
document that lower migration barriers (due to decreased transportation costs) led 
directly to mass movements of people and an erosion of international wage gaps prior to 
1914. A similar, massive convergence in wages has been observed following more recent 
reductions in migration barriers, such as German reunification in 1990 (Burda (2006)) 
and many others. But there has been much less discussion of the fact that international 
wage price gaps exceed any other form of border-induced price gap by an order of 
magnitude or more. 
 
Typical cross-border price gaps for equivalent goods, factors, and financial instruments 
are much lower than the price gaps we document for the labor of equal-productivity 
workers. Detailed price comparisons for 120 industries in 1999 executed by Bradford and 
Lawrence (2004) (p. 7) reveal that consumer prices in many European countries are 30-
50% higher than the lowest available prices for essentially the same goods in any 
country, while prices in Japan are roughly 100% higher. 
                                                 
31 It is not clear that historical wage discrimination against African Americans, even at its most egregious—which is to 
say, when African Americans were routinely and forcibly held as property by other Americans—was ever as large as 
the wage discrimination caused by today’s limitation of movement between the US and the poorest countries. Wage 
discrimination against slaves (not the full effect of slavery, but exclusively the earnings effect) can be plausibly 
measured by comparing slave rental rates—reflective of slaves’ productivity indicator in a competitive rental market—
to the cash value of owners’ maintenance costs. Though surviving data are controversial and inexact, some estimates 
suggest that US slaves’ productivity was roughly four times the cash value of food, shelter, clothing, and medical care 
that they received. This is well below today’s degree of wage discrimination produced by international borders against 
naturals of many development countries. Fogel and Engerman (1974) (II.159), for example, estimate $60.62 as the cash 
value of average maintenance and compensation for adult male enslaved field hands on large plantations, and the same 
authors (II.73) present rental rates for the Lower South of $143 in 1841-45, $168 in 1846-50, $167 in 1851-55, and 
$196.5 in 1856-60; the simple average of these four figures is $168.6. Note that these rental rates are net of 
maintenance costs (II.75), so the average rate inclusive of maintenance is $229.2. In a competitive rental market, this 
would suggest that enslaved workers were producing 3.8 times what was spent to sustain them. 34 
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Comparison 
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Based on source 
White v. Black, US 1995  1.1        Altonji and Blank (1999) 
Others v. Sched. castes, India 1976  1.1        Banerjee and Knight (1991) 
Men v. Women, US 1995  1.3        Altonji and Blank (1999) 
Hawaii/Guam v. Micronesia 1997    ~1.1–1.4      Akee (2007b) 
Max. ratio btw. US states 1999    1.4      Table 5 
Chinese v. Malay, Malaysia 1988  1.4        Schafgans (1998) 
Other v. Indigenous, Bolivia 1989  1.4        Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1993) 
Men v. Women, Madagascar 2001  1.4        Median |coeff.| on female, –0.33 
Urban v. rural, 43 countries 1999    1.4      Pooled coeff. on rural, –0.3 
US v. Puerto Rico 1999    1.5      Table 5 
US v. Mexico 1999      ~1.3  1.9–2.0  Table 2 
US v. Italy, circa 1920    ~1.5      Williamson (1997) 
White v. Black, US 1939  1.6        Sundstrom (2007) 
Asian v. African, Tanzania 1971  1.9        Knight and Sabot (1991) 
US v. Jamaica 1999      ~1.9  2.8–3.0  Table 2 
US v. Bolivia 1999      ~2.7  4.0–4.1  Table 2 
Men v. Women, Pakistan 2001  3.1        Max. |coeff.| on female, –1.14 
US v. India 1999      ~3.2  4.5–5.2  Table 2 
New Zealand v. Tonga, 2005      4.9  6.1  McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2006) 




Figure 4: Comparing wage gaps across borders to wage gaps within spatially-integrated labor markets 
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Though Bradford and Lawrence point to these deviations from goods price equalization 
as evidence that globalization has not “gone far enough”, we note that international price 
gaps for the labor of people from poor countries make all remaining global price gaps in 
trade look small. Many gaps in goods prices have been small for a century: O'Rourke and 
Williamson (2000) (pp. 29-55) report that the transportation revolution in the late 
nineteenth century brought prices of the most basic commodities, such as wheat, to near 
parity between the US and Great Britain. Over the same period, wage gaps for equal-
productivity workers between the richest and poorest countries have almost certainly 
risen dramatically.  
 
This holds to an even greater degree for price gaps in international finance. Lamont and 
Thaler (2003) survey the literature on cross-border price gaps for equivalent financial 
instruments, and point out that gaps of 15% are considered “inexplicably large”. 
Alongside gaps on the order of 1,000% in the price of equal-productivity labor, all 
remaining price gaps in financial markets amount to rounding error. 
 
The fact that price gaps for labor frequently exceed price gaps for goods by an order of 
magnitude has strong implications for the social welfare effects of different forms of 
economic liberalization. Welfare effects move as the square of price wedges. The World 
Bank (2005) (p. 128) finds that following an elimination of all remaining policy barriers 
to trade worldwide, developing countries would gain $109 billion in annual income by 
2015. But the simulations of Walmsley and Winters (2005) (Table 4, col. V) suggest that 
just a tiny relaxation of barriers to migration—allowing a movement amounting to just 
3% of the OECD countries’ labor force—would raise the annual incomes of people from 
developing countries by $156 billion. These aggregate figures suggest that liberalizing 
labor movements might be a more effective antipoverty measure than others—like trade 
liberalization—that have dominated policy discussions. We now take up this question in 
greater detail. 
 
4.3  Comparison with other antipoverty interventions for the marginal worker 
 
The increment in wages for the marginal worker moving to the United States is, for 
workers from many countries, enormously larger than the marginal effect on wages 
caused by any available in situ antipoverty measures.   
 
For example, the pioneering (if controversial) estimate by Pitt and Khandker (1998) of 
the net return on microloans to Bangladeshi women is 18%. Taking this substantial return 
at face value, this translates into an increase in annual household income of US$65 at 
purchasing power parity, so that a lifetime of continuous access to lending with these 
returns would return US$683 in net present value.
32  From Table 2, the annual PPP dollar 
gain to a male Bangladeshi solely due to working in the US is just over $10,000 when 
                                                 
32 Their estimate of the return to males is 11%, but we use the higher figure for females to be conservative. Average 
annual female borrowing is Tk3415, or US$361 at PPP using the average PPP conversation factor from World Bank 
(2007) over the relevant period (1986-1992) of 9.47. The resulting increase in household income is thus Tk615 or 
US$65 at PPP. Average life expectancy in Bangladesh during 1986-1992 was 55 years and average borrower age in the 
sample is 23, and a 33-year stream of US$65 payments (including one at time 0) discounted at 10% has a net present 
value of US$683. At 5% the value is US$1091 and at 15% it is US$493. 38 
scaled to purge selection bias.
33  In other words, simply allowing one member of a 
Bangladeshi household to work in the US for one month (for a gain of US$835 in present 
value) brings a larger increase in earnings to that household than a lifetime of microcredit 
(for a gain of US$683 in present value). 
 
Harrison and Scorse (2004) find that international anti-sweatshop campaigns against 
textile, footwear, and apparel plants in Indonesia caused a 20-25% increase in real wages 
for workers at foreign-owned and export-focused plants between 1990 and 1996. This 
translates to an annual wage gain of US$647 at purchasing power parity, which at a 10% 
discount rate has a present value of about US$6960. This is 58% of the annual wage gain 
from working in the US.
34  In other words, the cumulative lifetime effect of the anti-
sweatshop movement on an Indonesian worker’s earnings could be earned if that person 
had the chance to work in the US once for a period of about 30 weeks. 
 
In the country in our sample whose wage ratio is closest to the median, Bolivia, the 
coefficient on years of education in a simple Mincer regression for Bolivian residents is 
0.061. Since the average annual wage for Bolivian residents in our sample is US$3371 at 
purchasing power parity, this suggests that an additional year of schooling is associated 
with an annual wage gain of US$205. The net present value of a lifetime of such 
additional payments is about US$2250,
35 which is about 21% of the annual wage gain to 
a Bolivian working in the US.
36  
 
But the ability of many interventions to achieve even one year of increased education is 
circumscribed. Kremer and Miguel (2004) (p. 206), find that medicating children to 
eliminate hookworm, roundworm, and other helminthic parasites is “by far the most cost-
effective method of improving school participation among a series of educational 
interventions” attempted in Busia, Kenya that underwent randomized evaluations. They 
find that deworming raised the present value of lifetime wages for a treated child by 
US$30, or US$71 at purchasing power parity.
37 This lifetime quantity is equal to about 
0.6% of the annual gain to a Kenyan’s wages simply from working in the US.
38 
                                                 
33 Ro from Table 2, column 1 is 4.92, thus Re is roughly 3.28 and the annual dollar gain for an equal productivity worker 
willing to move is $10,021. 
34 They identify the effect by comparing textile, footwear, and apparel firms (the targets of the campaign) to other firms 
that were not targeted. The 20-25% real wage gain (p. 21 and Table 1B) is from a base mean 1990 wage of Rp1775000 
for foreign firms and Rp1462000 for exporting firms. We use the former of the two to be conservative, so that a 25% 
gain constitutes Rp444000 per year, or US$647 at PPP, using the 1991 PPP conversation factor from World Bank 
(2007) of 685.78. The annual gain to an Indonesian male from working in the US is roughly US$11981 (Ro = 5.82 in 
gives the dollar gain of $17971 in Table 2, and scaling by Re = Ro /1.5 = 3.88 gives US$11981). The present value of 
$6960 includes a payment in year zero. 
35 This is not the “return” to schooling, as Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) stress; it does not account for costs of 
the education investment, most notably the opportunity cost of time. Strictly speaking, by the assumptions underlying 
the Mincer model the marginal return to schooling is zero, since individuals acquire education until the benefit equals 
the opportunity cost. 
36 The present value is calculated at a discount rate of 10%, including a payment at time zero. The gain to a Bolivian 
migrant in Table 2 is US$16458 at PPP. Dividing this by 1.5 to adjust for selection bias gives approximately 
US$11000. 
37 World Bank (2007) gives the PPP exchange rate to official exchange rate ratio as 0.42 for Kenya in 1999. 
38 Kenya is not in our sample, but six low-income sub-Saharan African countries are, and here we use the lowest wage 
gain from among those: Ethiopia, whose wage gain is slightly lower than that of Uganda, a country that might be 
considered more comparable to Kenya. The wage gain to an Ethiopian from Table 2 is US$17,308 which, divided by 39 
 
Table 8 summarizes these calculations. For the marginal worker in a developing country, 
the wage gain to a one-off period of working in the US for several weeks overwhelms the 
present-value lifetime wage gain to the marginal worker from some of the most effective 




Table 8: A comparison of annual wage gains from international movement of the 
marginal worker, to present-value lifetime wage gains to the marginal worker from 









increment due to 
working in US 
(US$ at PPP) 
Weeks of US work 
equivalent to 
lifetime NPV of 
intervention 
Microcredit Bangladesh  700 ~10,000 4
Anti-sweatshop  
   activism  Indonesia 2,700 ~12,000 30
Additional year of  
   schooling (at  
   zero cost)  
Bolivia 2,250 ~11,000 11
Deworming Kenya  71 ~11,500 0.3
 
The figures for annual wage increments to US work are from the rightmost column of Table 2 divided by 1.5 to adjust for 
selection bias. The figures for present-value lifetime wage gain from development interventions are calculated based on 
Pitt and Khandker (1998) for microcredit, Harrison and Scorse (2004) for anti-sweatshop activism, a standard Mincer 
regression for the additional year of schooling, and Kremer and Miguel (2004) for deworming; see text. 
 
This of course does not suggest in situ interventions are not worth carrying out. Any 
intervention with a positive net present value is worth carrying out, and there is no reason 
not to do several in parallel. Furthermore, the general equilibrium effects of very large 
movements of people could differ from the marginal effects we measure, just as the 
general equilibrium effects of in situ antipoverty programs can differ enormously from 
the marginal effects measured by a field trial. That said, the marginal wage effects of 
movement can greatly exceed the marginal wage effects of in situ policies and almost 
certainly deserve a larger role in the discussion of development and antipoverty 





The combination of wage surveys around the world with the US Census allows us to 
estimate the wage differences across observably equivalent workers for 42 countries. The 
median wage gap for a male, unskilled (9 years of schooling), 35 year old, urban formal 
                                                                                                                                                 
1.5 to adjust for selection bias, yields a wage gain for equal productivity workers willing to move of about US$11,500 
at purchasing power parity. 40 
sector worker born and educated in a developing country is US$15,000 per year at 
purchasing power parity.  
 
This estimate tends to understate the gain in household welfare caused by crossing the 
border, to the degree that any of the wage increment is spent in the country of origin—as 
remittances or repatriated savings—where prices are lower and a dollar is worth more 
than a PPP dollar. We show that for a worker from the typical country in our sample, if 
one fifth of the wage increment from migration is spent in the country of origin, the real 
wage increment exceeds our estimates by roughly 50%. To be conservative, we do not 
make any corresponding adjustment in our estimates. 
 
On the other hand, the same estimate of the wage gain tends to overstate the true gains to 
a potential migrant both because of selection of migrants and because of welfare losses 
from moving. We use a variety of techniques to bound these two impacts and conclude 
that, on average, it would be conservative to scale back the ratio of observational 
equivalent workers by 1.5 to produce an estimate of the wage gains to a worker willing 
and able to move. This is a gain of $10,000 per worker, per year. It is a marginal gain in 
two senses: It is the gain to the next person who moves following a marginal opening (not 
the gain to a randomly-chosen person), and it is the gain given a small increase in current 
movement (not the general equilibrium gain under open borders). 
 
The same figure therefore represents the effect of movement restrictions on individuals’ 
wages. We contrast the magnitude of these wage differentials with closely related 
estimates from three separate literatures.  
 
First, these wage differences meet any descriptively adequate definition of wage 
discrimination. They arise only from socially constructed characteristics of the worker 
(like country of birth) that are not related to worker productivity (labor demand) or to the 
preferences of potential migrants (labor supply). That this discrimination is legally 
supported—in fact, mandated—and widely regarded as normatively legitimate does not 
make it any less discrimination.
39 The magnitude of wage differences induced by the US 
border exceed by roughly an order of magnitude existing discrimination in the US and at 
the upper ranges of our estimates exceed any documented form of wage discrimination.  
 
Second, the differentials we record are generally larger than price gaps for goods or 
financial instruments between developing countries and the US. While we do not produce 
estimates of the welfare gains in a general equilibrium model, our empirical results 
strongly support earlier estimates such as those by Walmsley and Winters (2005) that the 
gains from a marginal relaxation on barrier to labor mobility produced welfare gains 
would greatly exceed the total gains to developing countries from elimination of all 
remaining global trade barriers.  
 
Third, there is a constant search for policies to raise the well-being of the world’s poorest 
people at the margin. Based on our estimates of the annual wage gains from labor 
                                                 
39  We are not unique in this assertion. Arguments that migration restrictions constitute employment discrimination 
have been advanced in legal theory by Chang (2003) and in moral philosophy by Carens (1987). 41 
mobility one can scale the gains from these efforts—from microcredit to additional 
education to fair trade—in weeks-equivalent of access to the US labor market. These 
estimates strongly suggest that no existing policy carried out in situ can benefit the 
marginal poor household as much as one year of access to the US labor market.  This is 
particularly striking as, while development interventions have positive costs, the 
estimated welfare cost on existing residents of relaxing the barriers at the border are 
negative. By no means do we argue for the elimination or replacement of in situ 
measures, but we do call on researchers to pay much greater attention to the antipoverty 
effects of movement. 42 
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 A1 
Appendix Table A1: Raw bilateral regression results, Mincer specification (ARG to JOR) 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wages in US$ at PPP 
 
Country  ARG BGD BLZ  BOL BRA CHL CMR COL  CRI DOM ECU EGY ETH GHA GTM GUY  HTI  IDN  IND  JAM JOR 
                       
Years  educ  0.123*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.130***  0.123***  0.122***  0.124***  0.122***  0.122***  0.123***  0.124***  0.122*** 0.122***  0.123***  0.122***  0.122***  0.129***  0.138***  0.122***  0.122*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age  0.199*** 0.194*** 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.168***  0.199***  0.203***  0.195***  0.202***  0.201***  0.199***  0.192***  0.200*** 0.203***  0.199***  0.203***  0.203***  0.171***  0.124***  0.203***  0.203*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age2  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female  -0.489*** -0.499*** -0.493*** -0.492*** -0.490***  -0.485***  -0.492***  -0.483***  -0.493***  -0.492***  -0.490***  -0.481***  -0.489*** -0.493***  -0.489***  -0.493***  -0.492***  -0.452***  -0.467***  -0.493***  -0.493*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Rural  -0.186*** -0.197*** -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.178***  -0.185***  -0.188***  -0.188***  -0.186***  -0.186***  -0.185***  -0.194***  -0.187*** -0.186***  -0.192***  -0.186***  -0.189***  -0.188***  -0.303***  -0.186***  -0.185*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Early  arrival  0.161*  -0.559 0.402 0.462  0.701***  0.456*  -0.686  0.369***  0.843***  0.613***  0.983***  -0.232  0.545** 0.144*  1.375***  0.257**  0.041*  -1.268  -0.800  -0.027  -0.567 
  (0.483) (0.761) (0.839) (0.760) (0.377)  (0.555)  (2.039)  (0.240)  (0.529)  (0.153)  (0.244)  (0.631)  (0.635) (0.843)  (0.109)  (0.391)  (0.263)  (0.673)  (0.259)  (0.223)  (0.788) 
Early × educ.  -0.006*  0.037*  -0.031  -0.031  -0.051***  -0.031*  0.015  -0.026***  -0.054***  -0.051***  -0.069***  0.013  -0.039** -0.011*  -0.101***  -0.008*  -0.002**  0.074  0.047  0.008  0.035 
  (0.034) (0.056) (0.063) (0.055) (0.028)  (0.040)  (0.139)  (0.018)  (0.040)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.042)  (0.045) (0.061)  (0.010)  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.046)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.056) 
Late  arrival  0.544 0.461 0.729 0.923  0.720*  0.580  0.654  0.711***  0.781  0.718***  0.912***  -0.021  0.786 0.725  0.881***  0.540**  0.491***  0.578  0.210**  0.493***  0.321 
  (0.278) (0.313) (0.497) (0.457) (0.191)  (0.334)  (1.077)  (0.109)  (0.284)  (0.084)  (0.126)  (0.388)  (0.357) (0.346)  (0.069)  (0.184)  (0.111)  (0.484)  (0.124)  (0.133)  (0.572) 
Late × educ.  -0.047  -0.066**  -0.067  -0.088**  -0.062***  -0.056  -0.066  -0.079***  -0.078*  -0.088***  -0.096***  -0.017  -0.075 -0.066*  -0.092***  -0.045**  -0.059***  -0.053  -0.017***  -0.039***  -0.045 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.040) (0.034) (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.069)  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.025)  (0.026) (0.024)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.033)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.040) 
Foreign  res.  0.459*** -0.886***  -0.281 -0.699*** -0.803***  -0.909***  -1.555***  -0.552***  -0.114***  0.025  -1.033***  -1.351***  -1.514*** -1.200**  -0.297***  -0.217  -2.030***  -1.425***  -0.851***  -0.658  -0.974*** 
  (0.013) (0.014) (1.414) (0.035) (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.047)  (0.013)  (0.036)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.017) (0.571)  (0.017)  (0.303)  (0.059)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.999)  (0.055) 
Foreign. res. × educ.  -0.092***  -0.080***  -0.021  -0.065***  -0.019***  -0.012***  -0.024***  -0.032***  -0.038***  -0.051***  -0.047***  -0.098***  0.005** -0.074  -0.052***  -0.075**  -0.045***  -0.034***  -0.058***  -0.026  -0.056*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.151) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) (0.047)  (0.002)  (0.032)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.074)  (0.005) 
Constant  1.938*** 2.038*** 1.870*** 1.893*** 2.445***  1.931***  1.875***  1.998***  1.894***  1.905***  1.940***  2.042***  1.924*** 1.870***  1.936***  1.871***  1.873***  2.387***  3.222***  1.871***  1.878*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
                                       
Adjusted R2  0.385 0.744 0.376 0.409 0.576  0.393  0.386  0.426  0.379  0.381  0.410  0.572  0.429 0.376  0.396  0.376  0.380  0.618  0.730  0.376  0.385 
N  (total)  477869 462096 458302 461198 567995  516669  459060  493729  467842  475832  479941  463347  480361 462035  472732  463357  468665  567914  567096  474222  468632 
   N  US-born  456557 456557 456557 456557  456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557  456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557
   N  early  arrival  1088 412 476 503  1425  675  55  4175  767  6528  2722  710  515 309  5115  1988  3523  717  4900  6101  465 
   N late arrival  1996  1613  628  597  3752  1324  282  8870  1190  9723  5052  2101  1460 1599  8480  3731  8066  1059  22688  9468  609 
   N foreign resident  18228  3514  641  3181  106261  58113  2166  24127  9328  3024  15610  3979  21829 3570  2580  1081  519  109581  82951  2096  11001 
 A2 
Appendix Table A1 (continued): Raw bilateral regression results, Mincer specification (KHM to ZAF) 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wages in US$ at PPP 
Country  KHM LKA MAR MEX NGA NIC NPL PAK PAN PER PHL PRY SLE THA TUR UGA URY VEN VNM YEM ZAF 
                                       
Years  educ  0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.128*** 0.122***  0.122***  0.122***  0.126***  0.122***  0.123***  0.124***  0.122***  0.122*** 0.123***  0.122***  0.122***  0.122***  0.123***  0.126***  0.122***  0.122*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age  0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.175*** 0.201***  0.201***  0.200***  0.185***  0.202***  0.198***  0.188***  0.201***  0.203*** 0.194***  0.203***  0.202***  0.202***  0.198***  0.183***  0.201***  0.199*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age2  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female  -0.485*** -0.485*** -0.488*** -0.460*** -0.478***  -0.493***  -0.491***  -0.530***  -0.493***  -0.488***  -0.474***  -0.491***  -0.493*** -0.468***  -0.493***  -0.491***  -0.494***  -0.486***  -0.460***  -0.493***  -0.493*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Rural  -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.182*** -0.196*** -0.195***  -0.185***  -0.188***  -0.194***  -0.188***  -0.195***  -0.230***  -0.187***  -0.186*** -0.241***  -0.186***  -0.188***  -0.186***  -0.186***  -0.202***  -0.180***  -0.200*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Early  arrival  0.893*** 0.081 0.159  1.171***  -0.078  0.743***  -0.530  -0.062  0.016  0.619***  -0.054  0.420  0.719 0.050**  0.417  -0.744  0.593  0.169  0.409***  1.468**  -0.613 
  (0.302) (1.179) (0.980) (0.022) (0.589)  (0.280)  (1.825)  (0.414)  (0.396)  (0.353)  (0.163)  (1.603)  (1.275) (0.379)  (0.513)  (2.135)  (1.141)  (0.536)  (0.138)  (0.834)  (0.784) 
Early × educ.  -0.059***  -0.005  -0.007  -0.093***  -0.003*  -0.052***  0.029  0.000  0.001  -0.041***  0.010  -0.023  -0.060 -0.005***  -0.034**  0.064  -0.031  -0.012  -0.024***  -0.121**  0.039 
  (0.024) (0.080) (0.069) (0.002) (0.041)  (0.022)  (0.130)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.012)  (0.118)  (0.096) (0.029)  (0.036)  (0.144)  (0.085)  (0.037)  (0.010)  (0.071)  (0.054) 
Late  arrival  0.936***  -0.213 0.372  0.867*** 0.273  0.667***  0.500  0.037  0.141  0.618**  0.370***  0.663  0.605 0.775**  0.506  0.450  0.893  0.462  0.780***  0.538  -0.123 
  (0.150) (0.595) (0.507) (0.017) (0.317)  (0.154)  (0.767)  (0.217)  (0.370)  (0.178)  (0.089)  (0.881)  (0.678) (0.222)  (0.314)  (0.889)  (0.557)  (0.331)  (0.067)  (0.527)  (0.527) 
Late  ×  educ.  -0.088*** -0.002 -0.045  -0.094*** -0.042  -0.081***  -0.062  -0.027*  -0.022  -0.068***  -0.031***  -0.060  -0.064 -0.072***  -0.048*  -0.043  -0.078  -0.053*  -0.072***  -0.068  0.014 
  (0.014) (0.039) (0.035) (0.002) (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.052)  (0.014)  (0.027)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.065)  (0.048) (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.059)  (0.042)  (0.022)  (0.006)  (0.044)  (0.034) 
Foreign  res.  -0.464*** -1.456*** -0.180*** -0.553*** -1.949***  -0.576***  -0.948***  -1.082***  -0.913***  -0.658***  -1.595***  -0.069**  -0.954 -1.017***  -0.429**  -1.352***  -0.359***  -1.314***  -0.871***  -1.415***  -0.918*** 
  (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.048)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.033)  (1.487) (0.012)  (0.172)  (0.036)  (0.044)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.026)  (0.016) 
Foreign.  res.  ×  educ.  -0.087*** -0.017*** -0.058*** -0.021*** -0.065***  -0.035***  -0.031***  -0.068***  -0.019***  -0.043***  0.029***  -0.038***  -0.102 0.012***  -0.045***  -0.003  -0.036***  -0.036***  -0.083***  -0.088***  0.035*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.145) (0.001)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Constant  1.933*** 1.945*** 1.940*** 2.318*** 1.894***  1.898***  1.921***  2.186***  1.882***  1.958***  2.123***  1.898***  1.870*** 2.038***  1.871***  1.889***  1.885***  1.957***  2.200***  1.909***  1.943*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Adjusted R2  0.394 0.442 0.485 0.476 0.459  0.402  0.407  0.577  0.381  0.482  0.497  0.380  0.376 0.465  0.376  0.420  0.380  0.448  0.528  0.465  0.435 
N  (total)  466367 473901 461527 721542 463008  466491  457949  474006  472114  477360  535153  463021  457639 488980  530470  459559  475661  489750  504097  467427  476991 
   N US-born  456557  456557  456557  456557  456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557  456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557 456557
   N  early  arrival  1687 134 349  116807 697  2712  77  1303  2101  2207  13705  77  109 1984  772  71  238  1041  10856  143  531 
   N late arrival  1748  605  713  130236  3097  3519  251  3646  1772  5514  30869  175  503 2265  1342  290  429  1627  16781  194  1197 
   N foreign resident  6375  16605  3908  17942  2657  3703  1064  12500  11684  13082  34022  6212  470 28174  71799  2641  18437  30525  19903  10533  18706 
 
Table A1 notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include dummy variables for the periodicity of wages in the dependent variable (weekly, monthly, etc. ) with monthly as the base group. Each regression sample includes only US residents 
who are US born, US residents born in the sending country of each column, and residents of that sending country. “Early arrival” signifies a person born in the sending country residing in the United States who arrived before age 20. “Late arrival” signifies a 
person born in the sending country residing in the United States who arrived at or after age 20. “Foreign res.” signifies a person residing in the sending country. US-born US-residents are the base group. Asterisks show statistical significance at * 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1% levels. 
 
Table A2 notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include dummy variables for the periodicity of wages in the dependent variable (weekly, monthly, etc. ) with monthly as the base group. Each regression sample includes only US residents 
who are US born, US residents born in the sending country of each column, and residents of that sending country. “Early arrival” signifies a person born in the sending country residing in the United States who arrived before age 20. “Late arrival” signifies a 
person born in the sending country residing in the United States who arrived at or after age 20. “Foreign res.” signifies a person residing in the sending country. US-born US-residents are the base group. Asterisks show statistical significance at * 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1% levels. Education categories are 1) zero (base group), 2) 1-4 years, 3) 5-8 years, 4) 9-12 years, 5) 13-16 years, and 6) 17-28 years. Age categories are 1) 15-19 (base group), 2) 20-24, 3) 25-29, 4) 30-34, 5) 35-39, 6) 40-44, 7) 45-49, 8) 50-
54, 9) 55-59, 10) 60-65. 
 
 A3 
Appendix Table A2: Raw bilateral results, ‘category’ specification (ARG to GHA) 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wages in US$ at PPP 
 ARG  BGD  BLZ  BOL  BRA  CHL  CMR  COL CRI DOM  ECU EGY ETH GHA 
                         
Educ1 0.117**  0.118**  0.118**  0.118**  0.100*  0.117**  0.118**  0.115**  0.117**  0.117**  0.116** 0.113** 0.117** 0.118** 
 (0.055)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.052)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) 
Educ2 0.122***  0.123***  0.123***  0.122***  0.105***  0.123***  0.123***  0.120***  0.122***  0.122***  0.121*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 
 (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
Educ3 0.546***  0.544***  0.548***  0.546***  0.527***  0.546***  0.547***  0.542***  0.547***  0.546***  0.545*** 0.543*** 0.545*** 0.548*** 
 (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Educ4 0.869***  0.870***  0.867***  0.868***  0.890***  0.868***  0.868***  0.871***  0.868***  0.868***  0.869*** 0.871*** 0.869*** 0.867*** 
 (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Educ5 1.286***  1.290***  1.281***  1.283***  1.322***  1.284***  1.281***  1.289***  1.283***  1.284***  1.286*** 1.289*** 1.284*** 1.281*** 
 (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Age1 1.057***  1.033***  1.062***  1.052***  0.832***  1.060***  1.060***  1.014***  1.053***  1.052***  1.041*** 1.023*** 1.039*** 1.062*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age2 1.710***  1.694***  1.740***  1.723***  1.344***  1.720***  1.735***  1.654***  1.725***  1.718***  1.701*** 1.656*** 1.699*** 1.740*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age3 1.884***  1.859***  1.911***  1.894***  1.518***  1.888***  1.906***  1.822***  1.895***  1.888***  1.868*** 1.818*** 1.870*** 1.911*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age4 1.975***  1.945***  2.006***  1.990***  1.621***  1.983***  2.002***  1.919***  1.991***  1.984***  1.965*** 1.915*** 1.968*** 2.006*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age5 2.039***  2.005***  2.068***  2.052***  1.693***  2.045***  2.065***  1.985***  2.052***  2.046***  2.027*** 1.986*** 2.031*** 2.068*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age6 2.085***  2.042***  2.116***  2.100***  1.752***  2.093***  2.113***  2.035***  2.101***  2.094***  2.075*** 2.039*** 2.080*** 2.116*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age7 2.115***  2.074***  2.145***  2.128***  1.787***  2.124***  2.142***  2.065***  2.130***  2.124***  2.107*** 2.074*** 2.109*** 2.145*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age8 2.045***  2.006***  2.071***  2.055***  1.736***  2.052***  2.068***  1.994***  2.056***  2.050***  2.032*** 2.009*** 2.035*** 2.071*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age9 1.789***  1.757***  1.809***  1.794***  1.505***  1.797***  1.806***  1.734***  1.796***  1.790***  1.775*** 1.750*** 1.775*** 1.810*** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Female -0.486***  -0.493***  -0.487***  -0.485***  -0.487***  -0.479***  -0.486***  -0.477***  -0.486***  -0.486***  -0.483*** -0.475*** -0.483*** -0.487*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rural -0.200***  -0.212***  -0.201***  -0.200***  -0.193***  -0.200***  -0.202***  -0.201***  -0.200***  -0.200***  -0.199*** -0.207*** -0.202*** -0.201*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Early arrival  0.619  0.482  0.673  0.343  0.510  0.472  -0.580  0.133  0.662  0.223  0.143 -0.759  0.269  0.166 
 (1.649)  (2.206)  (3.763)  (2.105)  (0.823)  (1.485)  (1.031)  (0.634)  (1.392)  (0.273)  (0.551) (2.494) (1.370) (2.164) 
Early × Educ1  -0.540  0.335 (dropped) (dropped)  0.977 (dropped) (dropped)  0.291  -0.590  0.013  0.481 0.454  (dropped)  -0.314 
 (3.237)  (4.049)      (1.759)      (1.036)  (2.355)  (0.513)  (0.982) (3.780)   (3.670) 
Early × Educ2  -0.660  -0.166  0.541  0.834  -0.132  -0.323 (dropped)  0.155  -0.034  -0.184  0.338 0.933 -0.448 0.180 
 (1.831)  (2.487)  (3.910)  (2.429)  (0.962)  (1.684)    (0.716)  (1.524)  (0.310)  (0.594) (2.754) (1.660) (3.096) 
Early × Educ3  -0.562  -0.647  -0.739  -0.284  -0.435  -0.407  0.271  -0.120  -0.456  -0.316  -0.052 0.694 -0.142  -0.142 
 (1.657)  (2.219)  (3.769)  (2.117)  (0.831)  (1.497)  (1.240)  (0.638)  (1.402)  (0.277)  (0.557) (2.505) (1.388) (2.180) 
Early × Educ4  -0.538  -0.543  -0.708  -0.383  -0.531  -0.476  0.178  -0.143  -0.599  -0.344  -0.155 0.795 -0.375  -0.273 
 (1.655)  (2.217)  (3.769)  (2.115)  (0.833)  (1.494)  (1.150)  (0.638)  (1.403)  (0.281)  (0.559) (2.499) (1.382) (2.178) 
Early × Educ5  -0.484  -0.477  -0.692  -0.177  -0.618  -0.657 (dropped)  -0.171  -0.661  -0.429  -0.201 0.770 -0.486  -0.375 
 (1.668)  (2.266)  (3.808)  (2.157)  (0.871)  (1.523)    (0.660)  (1.449)  (0.353)  (0.626) (2.509) (1.431) (2.224) 
Late arrival  0.613  0.184  0.549  0.433  -0.036  0.257  -0.189  0.051  0.208  -0.015  0.041 -0.271  0.142  0.576 
 (0.883)  (0.737)  (0.933)  (1.153)  (0.416)  (0.821)  (0.446)  (0.195)  (0.580)  (0.142)  (0.240) (1.556) (0.654) (0.683) 
Late × Educ1  -0.609  -0.526  -0.839  -0.394  0.089  -0.148 (dropped)  -0.130  -0.274  -0.278  -0.069 0.750 0.223  -1.124 
 (2.922)  (1.201)  (1.405)  (3.825)  (0.654)  (1.420)    (0.392)  (0.957)  (0.247)  (0.456) (2.392) (1.874) (2.696) 
Late × Educ2  -0.464  -0.399  -0.588  -0.161  0.180  -0.242  0.184  -0.108  -0.198  -0.086  -0.013 0.574 0.198  -0.372 
 (0.931)  (0.839)  (1.064)  (1.249)  (0.469)  (0.917)  (2.792)  (0.229)  (0.632)  (0.159)  (0.262) (1.730) (0.854) (0.976) 
Late × Educ3  -0.751  -0.541  -0.641  -0.640  -0.056  -0.389 (dropped)  -0.344*  -0.456  -0.356**  -0.357 0.091 -0.303  -0.703 
 (0.890)  (0.751)  (0.948)  (1.164)  (0.423)  (0.831)    (0.200)  (0.594)  (0.148)  (0.248) (1.564) (0.664) (0.694) 
Late × Educ4  -0.823  -0.676  -0.803  -0.740  -0.142  -0.507  -0.122  -0.431**  -0.520  -0.496***  -0.480* 0.016 -0.502  -0.803 
 (0.890)  (0.746)  (0.954)  (1.165)  (0.423)  (0.831)  (0.503)  (0.203)  (0.602)  (0.157)  (0.254) (1.558) (0.664) (0.692) 
Late × Educ5  -0.758  -0.804  -0.629  -1.018  -0.209  -0.568  -0.189  -0.660***  -0.720  -0.750***  -0.774** 0.160 -0.537  -0.879 
 (0.894)  (0.751)  (1.212)  (1.198)  (0.437)  (0.845)  (0.550)  (0.219)  (0.675)  (0.202)  (0.305) (1.561) (0.701) (0.708) 
Foreign res.  -0.148***  -1.790***  -0.939  -1.847***  -1.600***  -1.433***  -2.381***  -1.440***  -1.025***  -0.904***  -2.113*** -2.377*** -2.358*** -2.086*** 
 (0.029)  (0.029)  (2.276)  (0.091)  (0.028)  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.036)  (0.095)  (0.048)  (0.060) (0.033) (0.031) (0.593) 
For. Res. × Educ1  -0.785***  0.093  0.072  0.323***  0.104*  0.057  0.008  0.116*  0.238**  0.149**  0.199** 0.322*** 0.267***  0.015 
 (0.064)  (0.061)  (3.438)  (0.105)  (0.056)  (0.102)  (0.126)  (0.061)  (0.115)  (0.074)  (0.082) (0.061) (0.065) (1.154) 
For. Res. × Educ2  -0.569***  0.160***  0.321  0.611***  0.424***  0.253***  0.448***  0.404***  0.480***  0.414***  0.608*** 0.146*** 0.541***  0.069 
 (0.034)  (0.033)  (2.411)  (0.097)  (0.031)  (0.088)  (0.095)  (0.040)  (0.100)  (0.055)  (0.063) (0.037) (0.042) (0.851) 
For. Res. × Educ3  -0.743***  -0.160***  0.421  0.258***  0.413***  0.252***  0.354***  0.389***  0.334***  0.222***  0.442*** -0.103***  0.791***  -0.166 
 (0.034)  (0.031)  (2.608)  (0.092)  (0.029)  (0.086)  (0.093)  (0.038)  (0.099)  (0.053)  (0.062) (0.033) (0.036) (0.606) 
For. Res. × Educ4  -0.679***  -0.007  0.366  0.136  0.628***  0.323***  0.315***  0.403***  0.276***  0.070  0.404*** -0.464***  0.994***  -0.120 
 (0.033)  (0.042)  (2.724)  (0.098)  (0.029)  (0.087)  (0.100)  (0.042)  (0.106)  (0.062)  (0.064) (0.037) (0.043) (1.130) 
For. Res. × Educ5  -0.699***  -0.164**  0.047  0.150  0.826***  0.480***  0.735***  0.363***  0.226**  0.063  0.182*** -0.680***  1.109***  -0.208 
 (0.035)  (0.072)  (8.717)  (0.100)  (0.035)  (0.088)  (0.148)  (0.040)  (0.104)  (0.072)  (0.066) (0.034) (0.157) (1.219) 
Constant 5.194***  5.228***  5.171***  5.184***  5.495***  5.184***  5.174***  5.240***  5.184***  5.189***  5.204*** 5.236*** 5.203*** 5.171*** 
 (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Adjusted R2 0.389  0.744  0.376  0.410  0.571  0.393  0.387  0.424  0.379  0.382  0.410 0.573 0.429 0.377 
N (total)  475731  459990  456241  459128  565725  514339  457004  491547  465756  473726  477768 461275 478235 459889 
   N US-born  454503  454503  454503  454503  454503 454503 454503 454503 454503 454503 454503  454503  454503  454503
   N early arrival  1088  412  476  502  1422  675  55  4173  766  6528  2722 708 515 309 
   N late arrival  1969  1611  624  953  3740  1308  282  8808  1184  9679  5028 2088 1457 1593 
   N foreign resident  18171  3464  638  3170  106060  57853  2164  24063  9303  3016  15515 3976  21760 3484 
 A4 
Appendix Table A2 (continued): Raw bilateral results, ‘category’ (GTM to NPL) 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wages in US$ at PPP 
  GTM GUY  HTI  IDN  IND  JAM  JOR KHM LKA  MAR MEX NGA  NIC  NPL 
                      
Educ1  0.117** 0.118** 0.118** 0.108**  0.098  0.118**  0.118**  0.117**  0.118**  0.116**  0.108** 0.118** 0.117** 0.117** 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.063)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.048) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055) 
Educ2  0.122*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.114*** 0.101***  0.123***  0.123***  0.122***  0.123***  0.121***  0.113*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
Educ3  0.545*** 0.548*** 0.548*** 0.527*** 0.496***  0.548***  0.547***  0.545***  0.545***  0.544***  0.527*** 0.547*** 0.546*** 0.545*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Educ4  0.869*** 0.867*** 0.867*** 0.879*** 0.900***  0.867***  0.868***  0.868***  0.868***  0.870***  0.878*** 0.866*** 0.869*** 0.869*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Educ5  1.285*** 1.281*** 1.281*** 1.313*** 1.358***  1.281***  1.282***  1.285***  1.286***  1.286***  1.310*** 1.279*** 1.283*** 1.284*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Age1  1.037*** 1.062*** 1.063*** 0.888*** 0.515***  1.062***  1.062***  1.043***  1.053***  1.026***  0.873*** 1.063*** 1.048*** 1.041*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age2  1.699*** 1.739*** 1.740*** 1.420*** 0.911***  1.740***  1.734***  1.703***  1.711***  1.684***  1.437*** 1.737*** 1.717*** 1.708*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age3  1.865*** 1.910*** 1.911*** 1.577*** 1.045***  1.911***  1.905***  1.871***  1.878***  1.855***  1.604*** 1.902*** 1.889*** 1.879*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age4  1.961*** 2.006*** 2.006*** 1.689*** 1.148***  2.006***  2.002***  1.966***  1.972***  1.953***  1.695*** 2.001*** 1.985*** 1.974*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age5  2.027*** 2.068*** 2.069*** 1.766*** 1.229***  2.068***  2.064***  2.028***  2.031***  2.018***  1.767*** 2.068*** 2.047*** 2.036*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age6  2.072*** 2.115*** 2.116*** 1.814*** 1.272***  2.116***  2.112***  2.076***  2.079***  2.065***  1.812*** 2.119*** 2.096*** 2.083*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age7  2.102*** 2.145*** 2.145*** 1.842*** 1.318***  2.145***  2.141***  2.106***  2.105***  2.094***  1.850*** 2.140*** 2.125*** 2.113*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age8  2.029*** 2.070*** 2.071*** 1.777*** 1.286***  2.071***  2.067***  2.032***  2.036***  2.021***  1.782*** 2.069*** 2.051*** 2.039*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age9  1.768*** 1.809*** 1.812*** 1.524*** 1.002***  1.811***  1.806***  1.773***  1.777***  1.761***  1.536*** 1.812*** 1.790*** 1.779*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Female  -0.483*** -0.487*** -0.486*** -0.447*** -0.473***  -0.486***  -0.487***  -0.479***  -0.479***  -0.482***  -0.455*** -0.473*** -0.486*** -0.485*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rural  -0.206*** -0.201*** -0.203*** -0.203*** -0.316***  -0.201***  -0.199***  -0.202***  -0.203***  -0.196***  -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.200*** -0.202*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Early  arrival  0.599*** 0.667 0.089 0.167 0.846  0.079  0.341  0.148  0.663  0.587  0.292*** -0.086  0.116  0.323 
  (0.167) (1.205) (0.540) (0.270) (0.797)  (0.589)  (2.440)  (0.411)  (2.070)  (3.128)  (0.041) (1.166) (0.547) (8.455) 
Early × Educ1  -0.056  -0.844  -1.264 (dropped)  -1.065  -0.551 (dropped)  0.312 (dropped)  -0.711  -0.127* (dropped)  -0.604 (dropped) 
 (0.271)  (1.947)  (1.130)    (1.852)  (1.691)    (1.037)    (4.064)  (0.073)   (1.274)  
Early × Educ2  -0.178  -0.595  -0.060  1.145  -0.630  0.087  -1.419  0.438  0.322 (dropped)  -0.007 0.330 0.243 0.968 
  (0.196) (1.333) (0.657) (3.106) (1.021)  (0.783)  (2.747)  (0.731)  (2.885)    (0.046) (2.040) (0.619) (9.132) 
Early × Educ3  -0.495***  -0.601  -0.164  -0.617*  -1.202  -0.086  -0.483  -0.072  -0.924  -0.470  -0.292*** 0.091  -0.096  -0.556 
  (0.178) (1.209) (0.546) (0.348) (0.802)  (0.592)  (2.452)  (0.425)  (2.135)  (3.144)  (0.042) (1.185) (0.552) (8.474) 
Early × Educ4  -0.667***  -0.572  -0.103  -0.327  -0.902  0.007  -0.340  -0.222  -0.688  -0.546  -0.438*** -0.058 -0.204 -0.501 
  (0.196) (1.209) (0.545) (0.306) (0.800)  (0.591)  (2.448)  (0.429)  (2.103)  (3.136)  (0.047) (1.177) (0.556) (8.469) 
Early × Educ5  -0.740*  -0.560  -0.050 (dropped)  -0.752  -0.049  -0.372  -0.266  -0.505  -0.398  -0.554*** -0.034 -0.193 -0.240 
 (0.390)  (1.237)  (0.584)    (0.805)  (0.606)  (2.477)  (0.574)  (2.148)  (3.166)  (0.092) (1.209) (0.635) (8.517) 
Late  arrival  0.004 0.101  -0.064 0.400 0.208  0.097  0.443  0.146  -1.670  0.153  -0.040 0.550  -0.027 0.455 
  (0.105) (0.328) (0.169) (1.384) (0.292)  (0.291)  (1.912)  (0.172)  (1.545)  (0.867)  (0.033) (0.953) (0.264) (2.183) 
Late × Educ1  -0.097  -0.059  -0.155  0.602  -0.362  -0.209  -0.768  -0.057 (dropped)  -0.163  -0.133** -0.863 -0.212 -1.202 
  (0.171) (0.552) (0.337) (3.390) (0.640)  (0.541)  (2.484)  (0.487)    (3.118)  (0.061) (2.046) (0.451) (2.660) 
Late × Educ2  -0.010  -0.087  -0.076  -0.318  -0.228  0.041  -0.199  -0.095  1.179  -0.757  -0.013 -0.632 -0.132 -0.193 
  (0.124) (0.386) (0.206) (1.568) (0.367)  (0.323)  (2.044)  (0.296)  (2.041)  (1.230)  (0.038) (1.298) (0.304) (2.507) 
Late × Educ3  -0.267**  -0.181  -0.228  -0.541  -0.325  -0.161  -0.640  -0.277  1.462  -0.445  -0.264*** -0.873 -0.300 -0.807 
  (0.118) (0.335) (0.175) (1.397) (0.299)  (0.294)  (1.924)  (0.207)  (1.562)  (0.891)  (0.035) (0.963) (0.275) (2.210) 
Late × Educ4  -0.435***  -0.067  -0.185  -0.591  -0.201  -0.080  -0.838  -0.359  1.537  -0.420  -0.417*** -0.792 -0.391 -0.964 
  (0.142) (0.340) (0.182) (1.390) (0.294)  (0.296)  (1.920)  (0.235)  (1.558)  (0.881)  (0.042) (0.956) (0.282) (2.203) 
Late × Educ5  -0.665**  -0.150  -0.220  -0.706  -0.170  -0.133  -0.641  -0.429  1.476  -0.410  -0.712*** -0.909  -0.710** -0.933 
  (0.266) (0.383) (0.241) (1.399) (0.294)  (0.318)  (1.938)  (0.530)  (1.562)  (0.920)  (0.065) (0.959) (0.336) (2.216) 
Foreign res.  -1.115***  -0.323  -2.804***  -2.479***  -1.940***  -1.199  -1.725***  -1.546***  -2.122***  -1.037***  -1.515*** -2.792*** -1.453*** -1.901*** 
  (0.034) (1.746) (0.072) (0.031) (0.031)  (2.128)  (0.126)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.032)  (0.026) (0.041) (0.055) (0.031) 
For. Res. × Educ1  -0.062  -0.617  -0.257*  0.190***  0.134**  0.420  -0.092  0.268***  -0.043  0.114*  0.138*** 0.514***  0.180** 0.509*** 
  (0.062) (1.787) (0.147) (0.057) (0.063)  (2.466)  (0.177)  (0.069)  (0.065)  (0.061)  (0.050) (0.094) (0.075) (0.067) 
For. Res. × Educ2  0.202***  -0.612  0.043  0.542***  0.287***  0.044  0.197  0.487***  0.249***  0.207***  0.567*** 0.228*** 0.484*** 0.653*** 
  (0.042) (1.753) (0.110) (0.034) (0.034)  (2.223)  (0.134)  (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.035)  (0.029) (0.047) (0.057) (0.046) 
For. Res. × Educ3  0.113***  -0.836  0.106  0.576***  0.172***  0.046  -0.045  -0.136***  0.310***  0.053  0.525*** -0.140***  0.243***  0.024 
  (0.043) (1.750) (0.097) (0.031) (0.031)  (2.121)  (0.128)  (0.050)  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.026) (0.043) (0.059) (0.065) 
For. Res. × Educ4  0.059  -0.804  0.429*  0.610***  0.162***  0.307  -0.093  -0.602***  0.552***  0.071  0.590*** 0.015  0.403***  -0.704** 
  (0.075) (1.799) (0.231) (0.032) (0.032)  (2.239)  (0.130)  (0.116)  (0.058)  (0.044)  (0.028) (0.042) (0.070) (0.348) 
For. Res. × Educ5  -0.152** (dropped)  -0.583  0.422***  0.109***  0.291  -0.140  -0.627***  0.161*  0.152  0.431*** -0.314***  1.255***  (dropped) 
 (0.059)    (0.423)  (0.045)  (0.032)  (2.355)  (0.149)  (0.088)  (0.092)  (0.098)  (0.027) (0.052) (0.241)   
Constant  5.208*** 5.171*** 5.171*** 5.426*** 5.932***  5.170***  5.174***  5.202***  5.197***  5.215***  5.426*** 5.169*** 5.189*** 5.199*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Adjusted R2  0.396 0.377 0.381 0.614 0.725  0.376  0.385  0.394  0.442  0.485  0.470 0.460 0.402 0.407 
N  (total)  470657 461272 466569 565564 564435  472060  466559  464296  471740  459465  718994 460931 464411 455887 
   N US-born  454503  454503  454503  454503  454503 454503 454503 454503 454503 454503 454503  454503  454503  454503
   N early arrival  5115  1988  3522  717  4897  6099  465  1687  134  349  116752 697  2712  77 
   N late arrival  8465  3701  8026  1048  22593  9375  604  1743  603  709  129862 3091 3506  251 
   N foreign resident  2574  1080  518  109296  82442  2083  10987  6363  16500  3904  17877 2640 3690 1056 
 A5 
Appendix Table A2 (continued): Raw bilateral results, ‘category’ (PAK to ZAF) 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wages in US$ at PPP 
  PAK PAN PER PHL PRY SLE THA TUR UGA URY VEN  VNM  YEM ZAF 
                      
Educ1  0.111** 0.118** 0.116** 0.117** 0.117**  0.118**  0.118**  0.118**  0.118**  0.118**  0.116** 0.112** 0.116** 0.118** 
  (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Educ2  0.114*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.122***  0.123***  0.124***  0.123***  0.123***  0.123***  0.122*** 0.117*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Educ3  0.537*** 0.547*** 0.544*** 0.538*** 0.546***  0.548***  0.542***  0.548***  0.547***  0.547***  0.544*** 0.532*** 0.546*** 0.547*** 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Educ4  0.882*** 0.868*** 0.870*** 0.870*** 0.868***  0.867***  0.866***  0.867***  0.868***  0.868***  0.869*** 0.872*** 0.869*** 0.869*** 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Educ5  1.305*** 1.281*** 1.286*** 1.294*** 1.283***  1.281***  1.281***  1.281***  1.282***  1.282***  1.287*** 1.300*** 1.284*** 1.283*** 
  (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Age1  0.903*** 1.060*** 1.030*** 0.995*** 1.049***  1.062***  1.020***  1.062***  1.053***  1.058***  1.037*** 0.935*** 1.043*** 1.062*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age2  1.520*** 1.734*** 1.681*** 1.605*** 1.720***  1.740***  1.652***  1.739***  1.723***  1.732***  1.689*** 1.545*** 1.709*** 1.709*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age3  1.688*** 1.905*** 1.855*** 1.771*** 1.890***  1.911***  1.820***  1.910***  1.895***  1.903***  1.858*** 1.702*** 1.882*** 1.884*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age4  1.786*** 2.000*** 1.949*** 1.863*** 1.986***  2.006***  1.926***  2.005***  1.993***  1.998***  1.955*** 1.793*** 1.978*** 1.981*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age5  1.851*** 2.062*** 2.013*** 1.927*** 2.048***  2.068***  2.000***  2.067***  2.054***  2.060***  2.017*** 1.855*** 2.041*** 2.050*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age6  1.899*** 2.111*** 2.061*** 1.971*** 2.096***  2.116***  2.049***  2.115***  2.102***  2.108***  2.065*** 1.901*** 2.089*** 2.097*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age7  1.924*** 2.140*** 2.092*** 2.000*** 2.124***  2.145***  2.076***  2.145***  2.132***  2.138***  2.095*** 1.940*** 2.119*** 2.127*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age8  1.861*** 2.066*** 2.019*** 1.933*** 2.051***  2.071***  2.009***  2.070***  2.058***  2.064***  2.023*** 1.872*** 2.045*** 2.054*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age9  1.609*** 1.805*** 1.764*** 1.690*** 1.791***  1.809***  1.740***  1.809***  1.796***  1.804***  1.766*** 1.615*** 1.785*** 1.800*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Female  -0.522*** -0.486*** -0.483*** -0.467*** -0.485***  -0.487***  -0.462***  -0.487***  -0.485***  -0.488***  -0.479*** -0.453*** -0.487*** -0.487*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rural  -0.209*** -0.202*** -0.210*** -0.242*** -0.201***  -0.201***  -0.253***  -0.201***  -0.203***  -0.201***  -0.200*** -0.215*** -0.195*** -0.219*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Early  arrival  0.986 1.564 0.363 0.142 0.145  1.390  0.255  0.844  -0.273  0.796  1.703 0.363 0.760 1.381 
  (0.900) (3.491) (0.843) (0.554) (1.129)  (2.084)  (1.033)  (1.280)  (0.668)  (3.977)  (2.227) (0.240) (1.127) (2.559) 
Early × Educ1  -1.313  -1.773  -0.037  -0.214 (dropped) (dropped)  0.055  0.587 (dropped) (dropped)  -2.295 -0.026 -2.021  (dropped) 
  (3.956) (4.938) (1.990) (1.077)      (1.725)  (2.168)      (5.250) (0.623) (3.061)   
Early × Educ2  -0.681  -1.471  -0.084  -0.060 (dropped)  -2.395  0.171  -0.281 (dropped)  -1.241  -0.811 -0.199  0.037  (dropped) 
  (1.173) (3.571) (0.988) (0.624)    (2.994)  (1.196)  (1.653)    (4.230)  (2.585) (0.345) (1.410)   
Early × Educ3  -1.133  -1.502  -0.233  -0.098  0.030  -1.481  -0.200  -0.830 (dropped)  -0.479  -1.614 -0.370 -0.713 -1.355 
  (0.911) (3.493) (0.849) (0.556) (1.325)  (2.137)  (1.037)  (1.292)    (3.987)  (2.234) (0.246) (1.182) (2.572) 
Early × Educ4  -1.122  -1.576  -0.421  -0.105  -0.074  -1.498  -0.354  -0.972  0.806  -0.792  -1.737 -0.365 -1.275 -1.495 
  (0.908) (3.493) (0.849) (0.555) (1.231)  (2.122)  (1.039)  (1.289)  (0.815)  (3.988)  (2.231) (0.243) (1.227) (2.566) 
Early × Educ5  -0.829  -1.482  -0.385  -0.097  -0.361  -1.897  -0.321  -0.884  0.268  -0.705  -1.627 -0.296 -0.770 -1.359 
  (0.934) (3.498) (0.885) (0.567) (1.574)  (2.363)  (1.073)  (1.313)  (1.134)  (4.075)  (2.242) (0.264) (2.029) (2.582) 
Late arrival  -0.240  0.336  -0.183  0.201  -0.004  -0.481  0.181  -0.047  0.718  0.255  0.357 0.063 -0.556 -0.815 
  (0.440) (0.989) (0.346) (0.232) (0.757)  (1.621)  (0.437)  (0.918)  (2.405)  (1.479)  (0.780) (0.093) (0.632) (5.557) 
Late × Educ1  0.060  -0.053  0.095  -0.187  0.455  1.184  -0.177  0.446  -0.961  -0.225  -0.259 -0.170  (dropped)  (dropped) 
  (1.062) (1.819) (0.748) (0.350) (2.479)  (3.507)  (0.586)  (1.345)  (3.401)  (3.279)  (1.886) (0.217)     
Late × Educ2  -0.032  -0.574  0.175  -0.120 (dropped)  0.763  -0.125  0.135  -0.230  -0.036  -0.457 -0.048  0.680  0.791 
  (0.546) (1.133) (0.418) (0.255)    (2.059)  (0.521)  (0.984)  (2.704)  (1.580)  (0.913) (0.125) (0.991) (5.644) 
Late × Educ3  -0.093  -0.506  -0.061  -0.356  0.040  0.288  -0.350  -0.165  -0.891  -0.298  -0.620 -0.277***  0.290  0.775 
  (0.451) (0.995) (0.352) (0.235) (0.843)  (1.635)  (0.454)  (0.932)  (2.437)  (1.493)  (0.793) (0.099) (0.702) (5.561) 
Late × Educ4  -0.123  -0.547  -0.162  -0.187  -0.423  0.253  -0.396  -0.143  -0.891  -0.589  -0.691 -0.228**  0.106  1.004 
  (0.447) (0.995) (0.353) (0.233) (0.845)  (1.633)  (0.448)  (0.927)  (2.417)  (1.503)  (0.787) (0.102) (0.748) (5.558) 
Late × Educ5  -0.002  -0.435  -0.324  -0.274  -0.168  -0.069  -0.680  -0.272  -0.842  -0.587  -0.758 -0.272*  -0.382  1.008 
  (0.451) (1.015) (0.371) (0.240) (0.961)  (1.659)  (0.464)  (0.928)  (2.437)  (1.536)  (0.796) (0.158) (1.094) (5.559) 
Foreign  res.  -2.035*** -1.167*** -1.261*** -2.291*** -1.309***  -1.835  -1.799***  -0.709**  -2.035***  -1.209***  -2.151*** -1.962*** -2.384*** -1.397*** 
  (0.028) (0.045) (0.035) (0.050) (0.096)  (1.778)  (0.036)  (0.311)  (0.055)  (0.207)  (0.045) (0.034) (0.039) (0.034) 
For. Res. × Educ1  0.236***  -0.427***  -0.547***  0.266***  0.473***  0.457  0.132** (dropped)  0.055  -0.020  0.061 0.147** 0.230***  0.085 
  (0.059) (0.106) (0.068) (0.070) (0.114)  (4.747)  (0.061)    (0.082)  (0.221)  (0.069) (0.060) (0.075) (0.062) 
For. Res. × Educ2  0.281***  -0.068  0.016  0.626***  0.890***  -0.059  0.685***  -0.160  0.338***  0.405*  0.345*** 0.439*** 0.307*** 0.343*** 
  (0.032) (0.058) (0.039) (0.052) (0.100)  (2.421)  (0.039)  (0.322)  (0.060)  (0.209)  (0.048) (0.037) (0.045) (0.037) 
For. Res. × Educ3  0.057*  -0.082  -0.116***  0.753***  0.653***  -0.389  0.767***  -0.274  0.321***  0.367*  0.306*** 0.036 -0.068  0.587*** 
  (0.029) (0.053) (0.035) (0.051) (0.099)  (1.960)  (0.037)  (0.322)  (0.060)  (0.208)  (0.046) (0.035) (0.042) (0.034) 
For. Res. × Educ4  -0.053  -0.099  0.047  1.179***  0.616*** (dropped)  0.976***  -0.255  0.758***  0.159  0.193*** -0.016  -0.444***  1.248*** 
  (0.033) (0.062) (0.038) (0.051) (0.103)    (0.037)  (0.334)  (0.064)  (0.212)  (0.068) (0.042) (0.045) (0.037) 
For. Res. × Educ5  -0.209*** (dropped)  0.642***  1.251***  0.588***  -0.906  1.193***  -0.387 (dropped)  0.119  -0.015 -0.450*** -0.731***  1.235*** 
  (0.035)   (0.087) (0.074) (0.116)  (3.039)  (0.048)  (0.524)    (0.222)  (0.058) (0.037) (0.066) (0.051) 
Constant  5.382*** 5.175*** 5.219*** 5.292*** 5.188***  5.171***  5.237***  5.171***  5.183***  5.178***  5.211*** 5.343*** 5.194*** 5.191*** 
  (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Adjusted R2  0.574 0.381 0.483 0.495 0.380  0.376  0.464  0.377  0.420  0.380  0.447 0.526 0.465 0.436 
N  (total)  471846 470010 475229 532727 460959  455581  486832  528367  457497  473507  487625 501954 465329 474877 
   N US-born  454503  454503  454503  454503  454503 454503 454503 454503 454503 454503 454503  454503  454503  454503
   N early arrival  1303  2097  2207  13696  77  109  1984  772  71  238  1041 10856  143  531 
   N late arrival  3628  1755  5472  30630  175  503  2256  1332  290  424  1623 16712  194  1188 






Survey data on wages and other worker characteristics from 42 developing countries 
were compiled by Indermit S. Gill and his team at the World Bank. Appendix Table A3 
lists the original sources and size of each sample, as well as reproducing the exact text of 
the wage question from each survey. A detailed description of the database can be found 
in Montenegro and Hirn (2008). 
 
In three surveys (India, Turkey and the US), the respondent’s education level is listed as 
achievement categories rather than as years of schooling. We translate these categories 
into years of schooling according to the information available in the surveys. In the 
particular case of the US we use the following concordance: 0 years if “less than 1st 
grade”; 3 years if “1st through 4th grade”; 5.6666 years if “5th or 6th”; 7.6666 years if 
“7th or 8th”; 9, 10, 11, or 12 have separate categories; 12 years if “high school 
equivalent”; 13.5 years if “some college but no degree”; 14 years if “associate degree” or 
equivalent; 16 years if “bachelor’s degree”; 18 years if “master’s degree”; 19 years if 
“professional degree”; 20 years if “doctoral degree”. This is a compromise blend of the 
methods used in Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) and in Jaeger (1997). 
 
All data except the cost of living index used in the wage regressions for US states and 
Puerto Rico come from the United States Public Use Microdata Sample (5%) of the 2000 
census. US state and Puerto Rico cost of living index comes from the revised 2004 
version of the Berry-Fording-Hanson (BFH) state cost of living index (described in 
Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2000)), which excludes Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of 
Columbia. In the BFH index for 1999, 1 is the purchasing power of $1 in the median US 
state. For Puerto Rico we use 0.86, which is the PPP conversion factor for 1999 from the 




An important question we do not take up in the text is the degree to which the surveys are 
representative of the wage sector and of the country—though all were designed to be. 
One way to check the representativeness of the wage surveys is to compare national 
accounts estimates of labor income per worker at PPP in each country to the average 
wage from the surveys we use. There is no reason to expect these to be equal—most 
importantly because the wage data we use do not include self-employed people and 
therefore do not include large portions of the informal sector, and even informal-sector 
wage workers can be harder to sample than formal-sector workers. But enormous 
differences between the two could signal problems in the representativeness of the survey 
data. 
 
Appendix Figure 1 plots this comparison. Labor income per worker is calculated by the 
method of Gollin (2002), under the assumption that a 0.65 share of GDP accrues to labor. 
The dotted line shows a 45-degree line and the solid line shows a cubic least-squares fit A7 
to the data including a dummy for Honduras (R
2 = 0.756; or R
2 = 0.607 without the 
Honduras dummy). Large amounts of self-employment would tend to push countries 
down and to the right; large amounts of low-wage informal sector work would tend to 
push countries up and to the left. 
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PPP Labor income, 0.65 share, log scale
45 deg. line Cubic fit w/o HND
 
Line shows cubic regression fit of ln(wage) on ln(labor income), its square, and its cube, with a dummy for Honduras. 
 
 
We draw three lessons from Figure 1. First, the agreement is in general very good. 
Average wage is typically some reasonable fraction of average labor income, varying 
across countries as would be expected given different relative sizes of the informal sector 
and the self-employed sector. Second, formal-sector wages are clearly not representative 
of typical worker earnings in the poorest countries with very large informal sectors (e.g. 
Sierra Leone, Chad, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Uganda). This is to be expected given 
that earnings gaps between the formal and informal sector are highest in the poorest 
countries (Vollrath (Forthcoming)). Third, the Honduras survey appears anomalous and 
we drop Honduras from subsequent reported analysis (since our preferred results are from 
bi-lateral regressions this has no consequence for other countries’ results). Overall, this 
analysis highlights the fact that all of the estimates to follow can only be interpreted as 
applying to a worker moving across the formal wage-labor sector. If indeed the formal-
informal gap is much larger in poor countries, this underestimates the wage gains for a 
typical worker.A8 
Appendix Table A3: Household survey data sources 
 
Country  Year  Survey  Survey agency  Sample   Wage question 
Argentina  2001  Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y 
Censos (INDEC) 
19,706  Cuanto cobró por ese mes por esos conceptos? (Monto 
total de sueldos/jornales, salario familiar, horas extras, 
otras bonificaciones habituales y tickets vales o similares) 




3,517  What is your total net take-home monthly cash 
remuneration after all deductions at source? 




783  What is your gross monthly income? 
Bolivia  2002  Encuesta de Hogares  Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas 
3,244  Cuál es el salario líquido de su trabajo en horario normal? 
Brazil 2005  Pesquisa  Nacional  per 
Amostra de Domicílios 
Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e 
Estatística 
107,955  Qual era o rendimento mensual que você ganhava 
normalmente em setembro de 2003, nesse trabalho? 




8,578  How much did you earn in salary/wages from this activity 
last month? 
Cameroon 2001  Enquête  Camerounaise 
Auprès de Ménages 
Direction de la 
Statistique et de la 
Comptabilité 
Nationale 
5,098  A quel montant estimez vous la totalité des revenues issus 
de votre emploi principal le mois dernier? 





59,532  En el mes pasado, cuál fue su ingreso o remuneración 
líquida en su ocupación principal? 






27,996  Cuanto ganó el mes pasado en este empleo? (incluya 
propinas y comisiones y excluya viáticos y pagos en 
especie) 
Costa Rica  2001  Encuesta de Hogares de 
Propósitos Multiples 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y 
Censos 
12,503  En su ocupación principal, cuál fue el ingreso 
efectivamente percibido por concepto de sueldo, salario, 
jornal, propinas, horas extras, en el último periodo de 
pago (semana, quincena o mes)? 
Dominican 
Republic 
1997  Encuesta Nacional de 







3,056  Cuánto le pagan o gana usted y cada qué tiempo en ese 
trabajo? 
Ecuador  2004  Encuesta de Empleo, 
Desempleo y Subempleo 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y 
Censos 
17,576  En su ocupación cuánto dinero líquido recibió por 
concepto de sueldo o salario u otros ingresos en el mes de 
marzo? 




4,776  What is the net amount received in basic net wage? 
Ethiopia  2005  National Labour Force  Central Statistical 
Authority 
22,568  What was the amount paid in your main occupation during 
the last period? 
Ghana 1991  Living  Standards Surveys 
Round Three 
Statistical Office  5,749  What is the amount of money you will receive for this 
work? 
Guatemala 2002  Encuesta Nacional Sobre 
Condiciones de Vida 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas 
2,584  Cuál es el último ingreso neto o ganancia que recibió? 




1,266  What is your cash income from paid employment (BASIC 
wage or salary)? 
Haiti  2001  Les Conditions de Vie en 
Haïti 
Institut Haïtien de 
Statistique et 
d'Informatique 
1,220  What is your wage, salary, commission payments, 
bonuses or other cash income (includying overtime) from 
employer? 
India  1999  Socio-economic Survey  National Sample 
Survey 
Organization 
94,306  What are the wage and salary earnings (received or 
receivable) for the work done during the week? 




129,279  How much is the wage/net salary received in a month of 
main work? 




3,723  What is the value of all income received in cash or in kind 
during the past 12 months? 





12,824  What is the total income from employment? 
Mexico  2002  Encuesta Nacional de 






18,064  Cuánto recibió el mes pasado por sueldos, salarios y 
jornales en el mes pasado? (declare su ingreso bruto) 
Morocco  1998  Enquête Nationale sur les 
Niveaux de Vie des 
Ménages 
Secretariat d’État à 
la Population, 
Direction de la 
Statistique 
4,043  Quel a été votre salaire en espèce dans votre travail ? 
Nepal  2003  Living Standards Survey 
II 
Central Bureau of 
Statistics 
2,216  How much did you get in cash per day for this job? 
 A9 
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Nicaragua 2001  Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares Sobre Medición 
de Nivel de Vida 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y 
Censos 
3,757  Cuál es el último ingreso neto que tuvo usted? 
Nigeria  2003  Living Standards Surveys  Federal Office of 
Statistics 
3,084  What is the amount of money you received or you will 
receive for this work? 
Pakistan 2001  Integrated  Household 
Survey 
Federal Bureau of 
Statistics 
13,186  How much is your take-home pay, including bonuses or 
cash allowances? 
Panama  2003  Encuesta de Hogares  Dirección de 
Estadística y 
Censo 
14,392  Cuál es salario o ingreso mensual en su trabajo? (si es 
empleado investigue sueldos y salarios brutos—sin 
deducir impuestos ni contribuciones al seguro social) 






6,254  Cuál fue el monto del último pago neto o líquido que 
recibió (incluyen descuentos por préstamos, asociaciones, 
etc.)? Si no le han pagado todavía, cuánto espera que le 
paguen y que periodo de tiempo incluye este pago? 
Peru  2002  Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas e 
Informática 
13,367  Cuál fue ingreso total en el pago anterior incluyendo horas 
extras, bonificaciones, pago por concepto de refrigerio, 
mobilidad, comisiones, etc.? 




34,626  Total Income, salary/wages from employment 
Sierra 
Leone 








2000  Labour Force Survey  Statistics South 
Africa 
21,707  What is your total salary/pay in your main job? 





16,772  What is the wage/salary you received last calendar month? 
Thailand  2002  Socio-economic Survey  National Statistical 
Office 
28,258 Wage  and  salaries 
Turkey  2005  Household Labour Force 
Survey 
State Institute of 
Statistics 
75,610  How much did you earn from main job activity during the 
last month? 
Uganda  2002  Socio-economic Survey  Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics 
3,204  How much do you earn per period? (effort should be taken 
to get the net salary after the deduction of taxes) 
United 
States 
1999  2000 Census Population 
and Housing (Public Use 
Microdata Sample) 
US Census Bureau  1,124,253  Wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, or tips from all 
jobs. Report amount before deductions for taxes, bonds, 
dues or other items 




19,142  Cuánto ganó el mes pasado como empleado u obrero del 
sector público o privado? 




34,569  En un mes normal cuánto es su ganancia neta? 




19,920  In the past 12 months, how much did you receive from 
this work in money and in kind? 




10,583  How much was your last pay? (net of taxes and any other 
deduction) 
 
Reported sample size corresponds the number of people in each survey who are wage earners and of age 15-65. Of the US sample, 500,319 were born in 
the US. 
 
 
 